- Oekraïense opperbevelhebber Syrskyi bijna afgezet
Onder druk van massale demonstraties tegen het ontslag van minister Fedorov, is president Zelensky op zoek naar een opvolger voor opperbevelhebber Syrskyi. De pro-Federov demonstranten hebben inmiddels een actiepauze ingelast, dat ook geldt als ultimatum. Vrijdag moet de zaak zijn opgelost. Of de door Zelensky verkozen oplossing voldoet voor de actievoerders moet dan blijken. Zie 3.
De Ukrainska Pravda heeft een uitvoerige analyse gemaakt over het conflict tussen Fedorov en Syrskyi. Fedorov ging niet alleen met de grove borstel door de militaire bureaucratie, hij verwaarloosde de mobilisatie van nieuwe rekruten. Dat is afgezien van de steun voor Fedorov nog een groot probleem voor een groeiende groep in de bevolking van Oekraïne. Ze hebben geen zin om gemobiliseerd te worden en het verzet dáártegen is groot en groeit. In de Oekraïense regering wordt ervan uitgegaan dat Rusland eind september een grote mobilisatie afkondigt en een grondaanslag inzet. De crisis in de Oekraïense maatschappij is aan alle kanten zichtbaar. Zie 4.
De kritiek van Fedorov heeft wel al effect gehad op de aanpak van de samenwerking tussen regering, legerleiding, afdelingscommandanten en de wapenindustrie. Een foto van het overleg met de president en de resultaten van het overleg. Zie 5.
Het IMF keurt een eerste lening aan Oekraïne goed, 690 miljoen dollar. Zie 6.
NRC is enthousiast over de drone-aanvallen op de Krim. Geen uitvoer van Russische landbouwproducten en grondstoffen meer. Na de Straat van Hormoez weer een belangrijke ader van de wereldeconomie opgeschort. Wat vindt de wereldeconomie daar van? Zie 7.
Een groep Duitse politici probeert het met schaduwdiplomatie in Rusland. Zie 8.
Voor de tiende nacht is Iran gebombardeerd door Amerikaanse luchtmacht. Zie 9.
De Houthi’s uit Jemen gaan Saoedi-Arabië blokkeren. Zie 10.
Het Pentagon heeft informatievoorziening over de oorlog met Iran beperkt. Duidelijk is dat er 17 Amerikaanse doden zijn gevallen en honderd gewonden. Zie 11.
Saoedi Arabië wil uranium verrijken en daar snel een besluit van Trump over, voordat de Republikeinen na de verkiezingen de meerderheid verliezen. Op 2 juli berichtte ik dat Nederland Groot-Brittannië van verrijkt uranium voorziet. LAKA laat op 13 juli expliicieter weten dat Kabinet geeft geen garantie dat Urenco-uranium buiten Brits kernwapenprogramma blijft, zie https://www.laka.org/nieuws/2026/kabinet-geeft-geen-garantie-dat-urenco-uranium-buiten-brits-kernwapenprogramma-blijft-760777.
In Duitsland gaat de slag om de vrijwilligers voor Litouwen door. Maar het lukt niet zo goed. Zie 13.
PAX en andere ngo’s hebben reactie op onder andere de Nederlandse defensienota geschreven. Zie 14.
De ontwikkelingen van 20 juli 2026 aan het front in Oekraïne volgens het ISW via de link
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/. Dit zijn hun hoofdconclusies:
- Russian milbloggers rebutted Russian official statements that Russian forces have secured the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway — the primary land route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea against Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes.
- Russia’s continued long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record-high civilian casualties in the war in June 2026.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and air defense systems on July 19 and 20.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 20.
- Russia launched two Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 94 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Herhaalbericht; Kom vrijdag 24 juli om 18 uur naar het Spui voor het 91e vredesprotest!
Met sprekers, dichters, muziek en twee minuten stilte protesteren we vrijdag 24 juli van 18.00 tot 19.00 uur opnieuw op het Spui in Amsterdam tegen het bloedvergieten, bombardementen op civiele en militaire installaties en onophoudelijk sterven in de loopgraven. Al meteen na de brute overval van Rusland op Oekraïne op 24 februari 2022 riepen wij onze Europese leiders op om in actie te komen en met onderhandelingen en diplomatie zo snel mogelijk een einde te maken aan het zinloze sterven en lijden. Ruim vier jaar later organiseren we dit protest helaas voor de 91e keer. De muziek komt dit keer van Your Local Pirates. Zie voor verdere ontwikkelingen https://www.stopdeoorlogamsterdam.nl/.
- Zelenskyy Weighs Ousting Unpopular Army Chief After Protests
Bloomberg, 20 juli 2026, ‘Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is considering removing the head of the army, according to two people familiar with the matter, amid pressure from widespread protests.’ Zie verder of https://archive.ph/CGUHb#selection-1251.0-1753.221 (zie ook Protesters give Zelensky until Friday as he weighs Syrskyi’s dismissal; decision expected soon, Kyiv Independent, 20 juli 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-weighing-syrskyi-dismissal-as-protesters-plan-final-rally-before-3-day-pause/)
- The resignation of the year and appointment of a new Cabinet: why Zelenskyy is removing Fedorov from the Defence Ministry
Ukrainska Pravda, 16 juli 2026, ‘On the evening of 15 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived late for a meeting with the Servant of the People faction. Prior to the meeting, Zelenskyy had had a long and difficult conversation with Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.’ Zie verder of https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/07/16/8044300/
- Zelenskyy holds first special Staff meeting with weapons manufacturers and corps commanders
Ukrainska Pravda, 20 juli 2026, ‘Zelenskyy held a special meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on 20 July that brought weapons manufacturers and army corps commanders together for the first time.’ Zie verder of https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/20/8045043/.
- IMF approves $690 million for Ukraine after review
Reuters, 20 juli 2026, ‘The International Monetary Fund’s board completed a review of Ukraine’s financing arrangement, clearing the way for immediate access to about $690 million.’ Zie verder of https://www.reuters.com/business/imf-approves-690-million-ukraine-after-review-2026-07-21/ (zie ook IMF Executive Board Completes First Review of Ukraine’s Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and Concludes 2026 Article IV Consultation
IMF, 20 juli 2026, https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/20/pr26254-ukraine-imf-completes-1st-review-of-eff-arrangement-concludes-2026-aiv-consultation).
- Met dagelijkse droneaanvallen op Russische olietankers brengt Oekraïne de scheepvaart in de Zee van Azov tot stilstand
NRC, 20 juli 2026, ‘Oekraïne heeft de aanval geopend op Russische olietankers en andere schepen op de Zee van Azov, voor Moskou een cruciale toegangspoort naar de buitenwereld. Daarmee voert Kyiv de druk op de Krim en de Russische oorlogsmachine verder op.’ Zie verder of https://archive.ph/9d9B2 (zie ook Schwarzes Meer statt Hormus: Bauern bleiben auf ihrem Getreide sitzen – was passiert jetzt damit?, Berliner Zeitung, 20 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/7hGFX#selection-1053.11-1877.339)
- How shadow envoys are quietly helping Russia come in from the cold
The Times, 19 juli 2026, ‘The informal network of German Russia enthusiasts is valuable to Moscow, which can pass suggestions to elements of the main political parties that are more open to their demands.’ Zie verder of https://archive.ph/tbopK (zie ook Nach über vier Jahren Krieg: Berlin und Brüssel suchen wieder den Draht zum Kreml, Berliner Zeitung, 20 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/QCRXX).
- US attacks Iran for 10th consecutive night
Al Jazeera, 21 juli 2026, ‘The United States has carried out its 10th consecutive night of attacks against Iran, with Iranian media reporting explosions in Sirik, Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, Shiraz, and Isfahan.’ Zie verder of https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/21/us-launches-tenth-consecutive-night-of-attacks-on-iran.
- Armed forces announce ban on maritime navigation for Saudi enemy, according to “blockade for blockade” equation
SABA News, 20 juli 2026, ‘The criminal Saudi enemy continues its unjust and oppressive siege on our dear people for nearly twelve years, plundering our resources and imposing a comprehensive blockade on our ports and airports by land, sea, and air. This has exacerbated the suffering of our dear people to an unbearable level, without any right or justification.’ Zie verder of https://www.saba.ye/en/news3746635.htm?cid=14.
- Pentagon Withheld Dozens of U.S. Military Injuries in Iran War
The New York Times, 20 juli 2026, ‘Central Command is not required to release information about injured troops, especially when they quickly return to duty, a military official said.’ Zie verder of https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/20/us/politics/troops-injured-jordan-iran-war.html. (zie ook Nearly 100 US troops injured in two weeks since Iran war resumed, Financial Times, 21 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/aTPnN).
- US greenlights Saudi nuclear enrichment without safeguards: Report
Middle East Eye, 20 juli 2026, ‘The Trump administration has greenlit Saudi Arabia’s nuclear enrichment project, but with no safeguards in place to prevent the development of a bomb.’ Zie verder of https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-greenlights-saudi-nuclear-enrichment-without-safeguards-report.
- Der Propaganda trotzen
Junge Welt, 21 juli 2026, ‘Tausende verweigern den Kriegsdienst, ein paar hundert aber widerrufen. Derweil findet die Bundeswehr nicht genügend Freiwillige für die »Litauen-Brigade«’ Zie verder of https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/526454.personalmangel-bei-der-bundeswehr-der-propaganda-trotzen.html.
- Tussen afschrikking en maatschappelijke weerbaarheid
PAX.nl, 20 juli 2026, Gezamenlijke reactie op internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Nederlandse overheid. Dit document is opgesteld door PAX, samen met CARE Nederland, Cordaid, Mensen met een Missie, WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform en Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). (zie de link om de hele reactie te downloaden). Zie verder of https://paxvoorvrede.nl/publicaties/tussen-afschrikking-en-maatschappelijke-weerbaarheid/.
Bijlagen:
Vredespolitiek verschijnt elke werkdag en wordt samengesteld door Guido van Leemput met dagelijkse medewerking van Kees Kalkman en diverse los-vaste tipgevers. Voor meer berichten, met name over bewapening, als deze zie ook Vredessite.nl; https://vredessite.nl/index.php.
Bij 3. Zelenskyy Weighs Ousting Unpopular Army Chief After Protests
Bloomberg, 20 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/CGUHb#selection-1251.0-1753.221 (zie ook
Protesters give Zelensky until Friday as he weighs Syrskyi’s dismissal; decision expected soon, Kyiv Independent, 20 juli 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-weighing-syrskyi-dismissal-as-protesters-plan-final-rally-before-3-day-pause/)
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is considering removing the head of the army, according to two people familiar with the matter, amid pressure from widespread protests.
- Zelenskyy has already started examining who could replace Oleksandr Syrskyi, with one of the people saying the Ukrainian leader is likely to pick Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi to succeed Syrskyi.
- A decision on a replacement hasn’t been finalized from a shortlist that includes 11 candidates, according to a second person.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is considering removing the head of the army, according to two people familiar with the matter, amid pressure from widespread protests demanding the military leader’s ouster.
Zelenskyy has already started examining who could replace Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, the people said, asking not to be identified because the matter isn’t public.
One of the people said the Ukrainian leader is likely to pick the commander of the Joint Forces, Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, to succeed Syrskyi, who could be dismissed within days.
A second person said the decision on a replacement hasn’t been finalized from a shortlist that includes 11 candidates. Zelenskyy’s aide Dmytro Lytvyn declined to comment, but told reporters Syrskyi isn’t likely to be dismissed on Monday.
Ukraine’s General Staff said Syrskyi hadn’t been removed and continued to perform his duties, according to a statement Monday on Facebook.
The president said he met with Drapatyi on Monday in a post on X, but didn’t mention any plans to replace the commander-in-chief. It’s the latest in a series of discussions between Zelenskyy and top generals since protests erupted last week over his dismissal of the popular Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.
Thousands of people turned out in Kyiv and other major cities to oppose the defense minister’s removal. Fedorov told reporters he’d sought Syrskyi’s ouster, accusing him of obstructing military reforms, but that Zelenskyy had sided with the army chief.
The Financial Times earlier reported that Zelenskyy was considering dismissing the commander-in-chief.
Presidential chief of staff Kyrylo Budanov said public opinion on the issue had been heard and called for calm, the RBC-Ukraina news website reported Monday. Budanov didn’t elaborate.
Syrskyi was appointed commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s army in early 2024, replacing General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who was dismissed following tensions with Zelenskyy.
He received praise in the early months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 for commanding the successful defense of Kyiv, as well as the counteroffensive that recaptured swathes of the Kharkiv region later that year.
Bij 4. The resignation of the year and appointment of a new Cabinet: why Zelenskyy is removing Fedorov from the Defence Ministry
Ukrainska Pravda, 16 juli 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/07/16/8044300/
On the evening of 15 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived late for a meeting with the Servant of the People faction.
This time the reason was not the president’s customary disregard for parliamentarism as such, or for particular MPs in the faction that took its name from Zelenskyy’s TV series.
Prior to the meeting, Zelenskyy had had a long and difficult conversation with Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, the last remaining member of Oleksii Honcharuk’s first government, who up until now had remained an integral part of Team Zelenskyy – although both the team name and most of its leaders and ideals have long faded into oblivion.
In six years, Fedorov had gone from being a marketer who pushed his way into Zelenskyy’s team to the architect of the “state in a smartphone” concept, a long-time generator of the most positive news stories for Zelenskyy, and later one of the key reformers of Ukraine’s defence sector.
After Andrii Yermak resigned as head of the President’s Office, Fedorov was among the leading contenders for the post. But Zelenskyy did not dare appoint him – Fedorov’s reform ideas were too radical. Rebooting the State Bureau of Investigation, introducing a competitive selection process for the prosecutor general, replacing all the deputies in the President’s Office – those were just a few of the sweeping changes he was proposing.
Instead, Fedorov was sent to the Ministry of Defence, as he was the only person who “had a vision of the war”. Zelenskyy believed Fedorov would act with greater caution and restraint at the Defence Ministry. It turned out he had no intention of doing so.
Mass purges of personnel, shifting procurement to open tenders, a strict audit of defence contracts, a reluctance to automatically approve all General Staff requests, attempts to move military planning to automated algorithms and mathematical models instead of traditional “manual control” – all of this quickly turned the Ministry of Defence into a hotbed of conflict within the military-political leadership.
On one side stood Fedorov’s team, trying to build a technologically advanced army; on the other, the General Staff and the team of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, who has been steadily shaping a smaller, more traditional Soviet-style army.
A clash between the two models was almost inevitable – and it happened within months. By early summer, the conflict had pretty much entered an open phase, and meetings of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff had turned into constant verbal clashes between ministry representatives and the military.
And eventually the generals gave Zelenskyy an ultimatum: it was either them or Mykhailo Fedorov’s team.
To a large extent it was these conflicts that led to the fall of the Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko’s Cabinet on 14 July. The resignation of the entire government provided a convenient opportunity to “deal with” the rebellious Fedorov.
In fact, after the Cabinet’s dismissal on 14 July, the most intriguing question was not who the next prime minister or most of the other ministers would be, but whether Zelenskyy would include Fedorov in the new government.
The Servant of the People MPs would not learn the answer until the evening of 15 July, when Zelenskyy turned up at the faction meeting and announced that Fedorov would not be in the new Cabinet of Ministers.
Ukrainska Pravda has discovered why Zelenskyy decided to sacrifice one of his closest allies, why he chose to preserve the current military status quo instead of pressing ahead with reforms, and who will ultimately take the key posts in the new government.
A president without Fedorov
“It was clear the president found this very difficult to talk about,” said one Servant of the People MP who attended the meeting. “For about ten minutes he was struggling to find the words, choosing his phrasing, trying to explain his decision. It seemed rational, but it was obvious that dismissing Fedorov was not easy for him.”
In reality, there was very little uncertainty for MPs regarding the new prime minister and most of the future ministers.
They already knew half of the names in advance, as they were already ministers. The first time they saw the other half was, as always, during the presentation itself.
The only issue the faction was really concerned about was what was going to happen to Fedorov – and that was the first question that MPs raised.
According to Ukrainska Pravda’s sources, Zelenskyy explained that he could no longer tolerate the ongoing conflict between the defence minister and Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi.
“They live in two different worlds,” one MP quoted Zelenskyy as saying. “Misha [Mykhailo Fedorov – ed.] wants to digitalise everything and build a system around technology. The military just want to be listened to. They request one type of weapons procurement, and he refuses and funds other areas. They simply stopped listening to each other.”
Another source recalled an even sharper exchange.
“It was getting ridiculous. Syrskyi would come in and say: ‘Fedorov isn’t providing anything for specific operations.’ Then Fedorov would come in and reply: ‘We provided everything – they’re just using it wrong, in the wrong way and in the wrong place.’ And it would go round in circles.”
In other words, Zelenskyy tried to get across to the MPs that his main motive was to somehow balance the relationship between the army and the government.
“I can’t allow the Defence Ministry and the General Staff to be fighting each other while the country’s at war. Ideally both of them should be replaced. But I can’t do that at the same time,” Zelenskyy told the MPs.
Zelenskyy also stressed that Fedorov had failed to deliver the mobilisation reform he had promised, and that then-interior minister Ihor Klymenko, whom Zelenskyy plans to nominate as the new defence minister, would be able to “sort out” the system for recruiting Armed Forces personnel.
“Zelenskyy said that if Putin announces major mobilisation on 23 September, there will be no time for jokes or digital reforms. Mobilisation needs to be sorted out before then,” one Servant of the People MP quoted the president as saying.
Overall, the president found himself caught between two competing visions of how the war should be fought – a conflict sharpened by the discontent of dozens of arms industry clans that are being squeezed out of the defence budget – and took the decision to preserve the rules of the game within the current military command structure.
The same people who as recently as last autumn surrendered the initiative on the battlefield to Russia had convinced the president that winning the war required dismissing the minister under whom Ukraine regained that initiative.
And of course, Zelenskyy made that “difficult decision” with a heavy heart.
(Zie de link voor rest van het lange artikel; de beschrijving van alle personele wisselingen in de regering).
Bij 5. Zelenskyy holds first special Staff meeting with weapons manufacturers and corps commanders
Ukrainska Pravda, 20 juli 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/20/8045043/
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a special meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on 20 July that brought weapons manufacturers and army corps commanders together for the first time.
Source: Zelenskyy on X (Twitter)
Quote: “Today, following several days of discussions with the commanders of our corps carrying out the most critical combat missions, I convened a special meeting of the Staff.
For the first time, there was direct, first-hand dialogue between our leading weapons and equipment manufacturers, the commanders of corps who actually use their products, Ukraine’s Ministries of Defence and Finance, and our country’s key special services.”
Details: Zelenskyy said the meeting was attended by the commanders of the Air Assault Forces, the 10th, 11th and 19th Army Corps, and the Khartiia and Azov Corps, together with representatives of Ukraine’s leading new defence companies.
The attendees agreed to establish a regular format for such meetings between corps commanders, manufacturers and government agencies, to be coordinated by the Ministry of Defence and the National Security and Defence Council.
Quote: “Most of the issues discussed were entirely practical: actual battlefield needs, delays in supplies, unresolved procurement issues, the additional funding required, and supply contracts for drones of all types and ground robotic systems, long-range artillery munitions needed on virtually every sector of intensive fighting, and other equipment.
We agreed to establish a regular format for exactly this kind of dialogue between the corps, manufacturers, and government agencies, coordinated by the Ministry of Defence and the National Security and Defence Council.”
Details: Zelenskyy added that the meeting also focused on specific rates of product defects identified by combat units using the equipment.
Another meeting in the same format with other corps commanders is scheduled for Tuesday.
Bij 6. IMF approves $690 million for Ukraine after review
Reuters, 20 juli 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/imf-approves-690-million-ukraine-after-review-2026-07-21/ (zie ook IMF Executive Board Completes First Review of Ukraine’s Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and Concludes 2026 Article IV Consultation
IMF, 20 juli 2026, https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/20/pr26254-ukraine-imf-completes-1st-review-of-eff-arrangement-concludes-2026-aiv-consultation)
The International Monetary Fund’s board completed a review of Ukraine’s financing arrangement, clearing the way for immediate access to about $690 million, the Fund said on Monday.
The war-torn nation is operating under an $8.1 billion IMF loan programme. The latest funding brings total disbursements under the programme to about $2.2 billion, the IMF said in a statement.
The review is a key test for Ukraine as it struggles to sustain economic stability and advance reforms while battling intensified Russian attacks on its infrastructure.
The IMF said Ukraine had maintained macroeconomic and financial stability despite Russia’s war. However, it said the economic outlook had weakened largely due to intensified attacks on critical infrastructure and spillover effects from the war in the Middle East.
The IMF said programme performance had been “broadly satisfactory.” All end-March quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met, although the end-June target on net international reserves was missed, in part because of the impact of the Middle East conflict. “Reform implementation has slowed, with several structural benchmarks completed with a delay or missed,” the IMF said.
To keep the programme on track, IMF staff and Ukrainian authorities agreed in June to a revised timeline for implementing reforms, corrective actions to address slippages and additional policy commitments, the IMF said in June.
IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva said on Monday that maintaining macroeconomic stability remained Ukraine’s immediate priority and called for prudent fiscal and monetary policies as well as measures to safeguard financial-sector resilience.
Bij 7. Met dagelijkse droneaanvallen op Russische olietankers brengt Oekraïne de scheepvaart in de Zee van Azov tot stilstand
NRC, 20 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/9d9B2 (zie ook Schwarzes Meer statt Hormus: Bauern bleiben auf ihrem Getreide sitzen – was passiert jetzt damit?, Berliner Zeitung, 20 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/7hGFX#selection-1053.11-1877.339)
Oekraïne heeft de aanval geopend op Russische olietankers en andere schepen op de Zee van Azov, voor Moskou een cruciale toegangspoort naar de buitenwereld. Daarmee voert Kyiv de druk op de Krim en de Russische oorlogsmachine verder op.
Met een gerichte aanvalscampagne tegen Russische olietankers, veerboten en vrachtschepen hebben Oekraïense drone-eenheden de afgelopen twee weken naar eigen zeggen zeker 183 vaartuigen geraakt in de wateren rond het bezette schiereiland de Krim. Volgens de architect van de drone-oorlog tegen de Russische bezetter, Robert ‘Magyar’ Brovdi, werden de meeste Russische olietankers van de ‘schaduwvloot’ aangevallen op de Zee van Azov, een cruciale toegangspoort van het Russische vasteland naar de Krim, de Zwarte Zee en – voorbij de Bosporus – naar de rest van de wereld.
Brovdi noemde het offensief, dat ook gericht is tegen luchtverdedigingssystemen, brandopslagplaatsen en havenfaciliteiten, Operatie MoLoTsjKa: een acroniem voor „Moskou zal vallen vanwege de Krim”. Doel van de aanvallen is verdere isolering van het strategisch belangrijke schiereiland en het afknijpen van Russische olietransporten, zowel voor de export als voor eigen gebruik.
Sinds het begin van de campagne is het elke dag raak, getuige de video’s die het hoofd van de Oekraïense dronestrijdkrachten regelmatig publiceert. Volgens Brovdi zijn de aanvallen zo verwoestend dat de Russen inmiddels elitedrone-eenheden van de frontlinies naar de kust rond de Zee van Azov hebben verplaatst om hun schepen te beschermen.
Nieuwe tik voor Moskou
De Oekraïense aanvallen betekenen een nieuwe tik voor de Russen. Vol trots noemde president Vladimir Poetin de Zee van Azov eind 2022 nog een „Russische binnenzee”, na de verovering, eerder dat jaar, van grote delen van het zuiden van Oekraïne. Volgens hem was de volledige beheersing van de Zee van Azov het belangrijkste resultaat van zijn ‘speciale militaire operatie’ tegen Oekraïne.
De Zee van Azov is economisch van cruciaal belang voor de Russen. Volgens analisten wordt – behalve veel olie en staal – een kwart van het Russische graan langs deze route geëxporteerd. Niet alleen het Russische scheepvaartverkeer vanuit de havensteden Taganrog en Rostov moet via de Zee van Azov naar open water, dat geldt ook voor goederen uit de bezette Oekraïense steden Marioepol en Berdjansk. Vanwege de kwetsbaarheid van de Krimbrug bij Kertsj wordt de Krim grotendeels bevoorraad door schepen en veerboten over deze zee.
Vorige week gaf dronecommandant Brovdi uitleg over de strategie achter zijn operatie. De aanvallen zijn vooral gericht op kleinere en middelgrote tankers die olie transporteren van het olierijke Kaspische Zeegebied, langs Rostov en de relatief ondiepe Zee van Azov, naar grotere olietankers op ankerplaatsen in de diepere Zwarte Zee. Vervolgens gaat de brandstof verder voor de export. Ook sleepboten en andere ondersteunende vaartuigen worden aangevallen. „Het lamleggen van Ruslands aanvoerschepen maakt het in wezen onmogelijk het ‘zwarte goud’ te exporteren”, aldus Brovdi.
Scheepvaart neemt zichtbaar af
Volgens Oekraïense opensource-analisten van Oko Gora hebben de Oekraïense aanvallen aanzienlijke gevolgen voor het Russische scheepvaartverkeer. In de eerste en tweede week van juli verminderde het aantal schepen dat op de radar zichtbaar was van 132 tot 43, zo’n 67 procent.
Volgens Brovdi is driekwart van de veerbootverbindingen richting Kertsj op de Krim gestopt. Langs die routes vervoert Rusland het leeuwendeel van het militair materieel naar het bezette schiereiland. De Krim, door Poetin dit jaar nog een „onzinkbaar vliegdekschip” genoemd, heeft een doorslaggevende rol bij de bevoorrading van Russische troepen aan het zuidelijk front in Oekraïne.
Oekraïne heeft sinds het begin dit jaar het initiatief in de oorlog tegen Rusland langzaam maar zeker overgenomen. Op land is de Russische opmars grotendeels tot stilstand gekomen, maar de luchtoorlog tussen beide landen – vooral gevoerd met raketten en drones – escaleert steeds verder. De Oekraïense strijdkrachten maken daarbij gebruik van hun technologische voorsprong bij de ontwikkeling van drones.
Dankzij de grootschalige inzet van drones die voorzien zijn van camera’s slaagt Kyiv er steeds beter in over grotere afstanden precisieaanvallen uit te voeren op voertuigen en schepen. Met die aanvallen wil de Oekraïense krijgsmacht een ‘logistieke lockdown’ veroorzaken, zodat de bevoorrading van de Krim en Russische fronttroepen wordt bemoeilijkt.
Tien miljoen Oekraïense drones per jaar
Tot begin dit jaar opereerden Russische havensteden, de scheepvaart en de militaire infrastructuur ver achter de frontlinies tamelijk ongestoord. Oekraïense aanvallen ‘in de diepte’ waren de afgelopen jaren vooral gericht op de Russische olie-industrie.
Door de exponentiële groei van het aantal Oekraïense kamikazedrones voor de langere afstanden komen meer Russische doelen in beeld. Volgens president Volodymyr Zelensky produceert Oekraïne inmiddels tien miljoen drones per jaar.
Wat de campagne tegen de scheepvaart opmerkelijk maakt, is dat ze plaatsvindt in een van de zwaarst verdedigde luchtruimen van het door Rusland gecontroleerde gebied aan de Zwarte Zee, schreef de Australische generaal buiten dienst Mick Ryan onlangs.
Even opmerkelijk is dat Oekraïne er met louter onbemande systemen in lijkt te slagen de controle over de Zwarte Zee en de Zee van Azov over te nemen. Eerder slaagde Oekraïne er met gerichte droneaanvallen al in de Russische Zwarte Zeevloot uit het hoofdkwartier in Sevastopol op de Krim te verdrijven. Russische oorlogsschepen laten zich volgens Kyiv nauwelijks meer zien op de Zwarte Zee; ze zouden te kwetsbaar zijn voor potentiële aanvallen door Oekraïense zeedrones.
Bij 8. How shadow envoys are quietly helping Russia come in from the cold
The Times, 19 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/tbopK (zie ook Nach über vier Jahren Krieg: Berlin und Brüssel suchen wieder den Draht zum Kreml, Berliner Zeitung, 20 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/QCRXX. En ook Hintertür nach Moskau?Die Zeit 16 juli 2026,
The informal network of German Russia enthusiasts is valuable to Moscow, which can pass suggestions to elements of the main political parties that are more open to their demands
First the Kremlin floated Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor turned pro-Russian lobbyist, as an intermediary for putative ceasefire negotiations with Ukraine.
Then the Brussels rumour mill spat out the name of Angela Merkel, Schröder’s successor, who brokered the failed Minsk accords between Kyiv and Moscow after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Lately the focus of speculation has shifted to Germany’s president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who was Schröder’s political fixer and then Merkel’s foreign minister, as a possible candidate for the role of de facto peace envoy to the Putin regime.
Amid the fruitless diplomatic conjecture at higher levels, however, a group of German lobbyists and retired politicians have quietly established a persistent back channel to the Russian government.
Last week a small delegation including Ronald Pofalla, Merkel’s erstwhile chief of staff, and Matthias Platzeck, a former chief minister of Brandenburg, held a clandestine meeting in Baku with several of Putin’s associates.
According to Die Zeit and ARD, the German outlets that first reported on the summit, the Russian representatives included Valery Fadeyev, who leads the Russian president’s council on civil society and human rights.
Viktor Zubkov, an octogenarian who was once Putin’s deputy prime minister and now chairs the board of the Gazprom state energy conglomerate, also took part.
This was the latest session of an informal Russo-German network that styles itself as the successor to the Petersburger Dialog, which used to bring a broad selection of both countries’ elites together for discussions but was wound up in 2021.
A core group of German Russia enthusiasts around Pofalla, the last chairman of the format, kept the connection ticking over after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and had at least four previous meetings at luxury hotels in Baku and Abu Dhabi.
Among the German participants in previous meetings were Ralf Stegner, a prominent left-wing MP from Schröder and Platzeck’s Social Democratic party (SPD), and Stephan Holthoff-Pförtner, a former regional minister from Merkel and Pofalla’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) who is closely associated with Armin Laschet, a senior CDU MP.
The German delegates describe the Baku connection in vague terms as a strictly private project. The government in Berlin has also distanced itself from their efforts.
Thorsten Frei, chief of staff to Friedrich Merz, the chancellor, said he still saw no reason to believe that Russia was willing to engage in meaningful negotiations over the conflict in Ukraine. “All international attempts to do this have failed miserably, and always on Russia’s account,” Frei told Die Zeit.
John Lough, a Russia expert at the Chatham House and New Eurasian Strategies Centre think tanks, said the format was “clearly not German government policy”.
“But they have value for the Russians as a channel to send messages to the parts of the SPD and CDU that are instinctively accommodationist,” Lough said.
“Germany is a high-priority target for the Kremlin because of its economic power and its potential ability to rebuild its defences and be at the centre of a new European-based defence system that will gradually replace Nato.”
However, diplomats from some of Germany’s European allies are concerned that there may be more to these gatherings than meets the eye.
Late last year it was reported that Pofalla had prevailed upon the German foreign ministry to approve a visit from Mikhail Shvydkoy, Putin’s “special presidential envoy” for cultural diplomacy. There is no evidence that Shvydkoy made the journey, although he is thought to have a Schengen zone entry visa from a previous trip to Austria.
There is speculation in Berlin that Pofalla, who maintains high-ranking contacts on both sides, may be positioning himself as a middleman for a more serious exercise in shadow diplomacy when the time is ripe. Pofalla has been contacted for comment.
One source said a “vibe shift” had taken place in Germany’s attitude towards talks with Russia and various loosely co-ordinated initiatives were under way to open channels of communication.
However, German officials said there was no substance to rumours that Merz had recently rebuffed an offer from Steinmeier to serve as an interlocutor with Moscow.
As Russia’s fortunes have reversed on the battlefield in Ukraine and its troubles have mounted on the home front, there have been broader discussions in Europe about taking a more active role in orchestrating ceasefire talks.
Merkel, Schröder, President Stubb of Finland, his predecessor Sauli Niinisto and Mario Draghi, the former Italian prime minister, were all mooted by various parties as potential interlocutors.
Last month the chief of staff to Antonio Costa, the president of the European Council, made two calls to an unspecified senior aide in Putin’s inner circle.
A few days later the ambassadors from Britain, France and Germany, which have been co-ordinating their diplomacy through the E3 format — an informal arrangement between the three — paid an apparently fruitless call to the Russian foreign ministry.
All this activity appears to have foundered on a lack of any real engagement from the Kremlin.
Last week Stubb, who had advocated “initiating possible contacts” with Russia, told the Maaseudun Tulevaisuus magazine in Finland that he had changed his mind and now believed the conversations would be futile without the involvement of the United States.
It is not clear what Germany could hope to achieve through bilateral talks with Russia, even on an unofficial basis, since any substantive initiative would have to be cleared with Ukraine, Britain, France and the European Commission at a minimum.
Nor is it easy to identify a German figure who could credibly take the lead in any such process, not least because of lingering suspicion in Ukraine and some of Berlin’s other European partners about its historic entanglement with Russia.
Schröder is regarded as hopelessly compromised by his friendship with Putin and his consistent advocacy of Russian interests. Steinmeier is also viewed with suspicion because of his long record of pursuing friendly relations with Moscow before 2022.
Merkel said no one had approached her about an EU special envoy role and in any case she did not believe Putin would engage with a European representative who does not wield political power in their own right.
Bij 9. US attacks Iran for 10th consecutive night
Al Jazeera, 21 juli 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/21/us-launches-tenth-consecutive-night-of-attacks-on-iran
Washington vows revenge for US military casualties, while Iran claims attacks on US sites across the region.
The United States has carried out its 10th consecutive night of attacks against Iran, with Iranian media reporting explosions in Sirik, Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, Shiraz, and Isfahan.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the operation on Monday evening, claiming that the strikes are “designed to further degrade Iranian military capabilities used to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz”.
CENTCOM said that the strikes had been completed at 9 pm Eastern Time (0100 GMT), after hitting “Iranian military command centers, maritime capabilities, missile and drone launch sites, and air defense systems”.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued statements claiming to have retaliated by launching strikes on Kuwait, targeting “US HIMARS missile systems”, radars, satellite receivers, a telecommunications centre and MQ-9 drone hangar at multiple locations in the country.
The IRGC also claimed to have destroyed a radar and US air defence systems in Bahrain.
Two Greek-owned oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz were struck earlier on Monday, while the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reports that another tanker was hit off the coast of Oman’s port city of Limah causing the crew to abandon it. Early Tuesday morning, the IRGC claimed that two more oil tankers that attempted to “pass through the unsafe southern route in the Strait of Hormuz” had suffered explosions and “massive fires”.
Shortly before the night’s bombing began, US President Donald Trump took to social media to warn that Iranian attacks on US military personnel would be paid back “many times over”. On Friday, two US soldiers were killed, and a third was reported missing when an Iranian missile struck a military site in Jordan, while another US service member was killed in northern Iraq.
Trump also reiterated earlier warnings that continued Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz would be met with a stronger response.
US Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has called for an end to the conflict with Iran, saying Democrats will force Republicans to vote on halting military operations.
Posting on X, Schumer wrote: “Every second Trump prolongs his war in Iran is another second our service members remain in danger”. Senate democrats will “force Senate Republicans to take another vote to end this war and bring our troops home”, he said.
In a statement to Al Jazeera, the White House said strikes on Iran will continue until Trump decides otherwise, but ended the statement by saying that diplomatic talks between the US and Iran are ongoing.
Meanwhile, Yemen’s pro-Iranian Houthis have declared a blockade on Saudi Arabia, escalating tensions and sparking fears that the Yemeni conflict, which had been relatively quiet for four years, may be about to reignite and threaten shipping in the Red Sea.
Bij 10. Armed forces announce ban on maritime navigation for Saudi enemy, according to “blockade for blockade” equation
SABA News, 20 juli 2026, https://www.saba.ye/en/news3746635.htm?cid=14
The criminal Saudi enemy continues its unjust and oppressive siege on our dear people for nearly twelve years, plundering our resources and imposing a comprehensive blockade on our ports and airports by land, sea, and air.
This has exacerbated the suffering of our dear people to an unbearable level, without any right or justification.
This is unacceptable and cannot be tolerated, as it is based on no legal or humanitarian right or justification and has no legitimacy whatsoever, It is an invalid and agressive siege, with its disastrous consequences for our dear Yemeni people, began by the targeting of Sana’a International Airport in a cruel and treacherous attack on our country.
Our people cannot endure this unjust siege and aggression without taking a stand, our great people are a faithful and resilient people, a people of faith and wisdom, with a just cause, and they have the full right to confront this unjust siege and aggression by all available means.
Therefore, and in response to the calls of our dear, valiant people for the great million-man demonstration on the Friday of Warning and Mobilization, and the preceding large tribal gatherings and rallies.
The Yemeni Armed Forces affirm the following:
First: The Yemeni Armed Forces declare a maritime embargo against the criminal Saudi enemy, based on the equation of “an eye for an eye,” effective immediately upon the issuance of this statement.
Second: We affirm the right of our great people to respond to the blockade with a blockade, and to respond to all escalation with all escalation, thus solidifying this equation.
Third: The Yemeni Armed Forces affirm their complete readiness for all options, and any foolish act committed by the reckless Saudi enemy through all escalation will be met with a comprehensive and decisive escalation, by Allah’s will and power.
Fourth: We call upon the people of our great nation to continue the general mobilization and general call to arms, and to be fully prepared for all scenarios and developments, and to support the fronts with fighters.
Fifth: We extend our greetings with pride and reverence to our great Yemeni people who turned out in an unprecedented million-man March of Warning and Mobilization.
We assure them that we will spare no effort in restoring their plundered rights and ending the unjust siege imposed upon them, whatever the consequences and repercussions, relying on Allah and placing our trust in Allah.
Bij 11. Pentagon Withheld Dozens of U.S. Military Injuries in Iran War
The New York Times, 20 juli 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/20/us/politics/troops-injured-jordan-iran-war.html. (zie ook Nearly 100 US troops injured in two weeks since Iran war resumed, Financial Times, 21 juli 2026, https://archive.ph/aTPnN)
Central Command is not required to release information about injured troops, especially when they quickly return to duty, a military official said.
In the week leading up to the Iranian attack on Friday that killed two U.S. soldiers and left one service member missing in Jordan, Iran carried out three other strikes against U.S. forces in the country.
Those attacks injured dozens of U.S. service members and damaged several helicopters, according to several U.S. officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters. But the Pentagon did not disclose the earlier strikes, nor the casualties and damage they inflicted.
The episode is the latest example during the Iran conflict of the tension between what the Pentagon says is the need for operational security and the government’s obligation to inform the public about the conduct of the war.
In statements after airstrikes against Iranian military sites last week, U.S. Central Command said it was retaliating for Iran’s attacks against commercial ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, never mentioning Iran’s strikes on bases in the region, including in Jordan.
Central Command is not required to release information about injured service members, especially when they quickly return to duty, a U.S. military official said.
Moreover, another U.S. military official added, why would the Pentagon divulge information that could help Iran zero in on its deadly ballistic missiles and drone attacks in Jordan and other bases in the Middle East where thousands of American troops are stationed?
Central Command has also stopped announcing how many sites in Iran it hits each day for the same reason, U.S. officials say.
Sean Parnell, the chief Pentagon spokesman, said that the military had not withheld or misrepresented U.S. casualties in the war. “Claims of concealment are fabrications meant to further distress the American people in the wake of three service members killed in action,” he said in a statement.
He pointed to the Pentagon’s Defense Casualty Analysis System, which he said was “regularly updated” with the latest information regarding dead and wounded U.S. troops. The publicly available site offers aggregate figures, but does not include information on specific mass-casualty attacks of the sort that have occurred in Jordan over the last week.
“Cherry-picking raw numbers without context paints a deliberately misleading and incomplete picture,” Mr. Parnell added.
In the days since the collapse of a fragile truce, the Pentagon has provided little information about the American military strategy after nearly five months of war. The last major Pentagon briefing on the war was in early May.
In the past several months, the Trump administration has failed to disclose how the Iran war has drained U.S. supplies of critical, costly weapons, and how Iran retained and rebuilt substantial missile capabilities.
The subject of American casualties in the war is similarly sensitive.
The deaths of two Army soldiers in Jordan on Friday and another service member in northern Iraq bring to 17 the total number of American military personnel killed since the United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran on Feb. 28.
The Pentagon’s casualty reporting protocols call for publicly identifying deceased service members only after 24 hours have passed since next of kin were notified. The names of troops wounded in action are not typically released.
In a statement on Saturday, Central Command said four American service members wounded in Friday’s attack were taken to Jordanian hospitals and had been discharged. More American troops received minor injuries and had returned to duty, the statement said, but it did not specify how many.
And the statement did not mention service members injured in the three previous attacks in Jordan last week.
In a brief phone call with NewsNation, President Trump said the troops died “in service of our country” and reiterated the war’s primary goal of “never allowing Iran to have a nuclear weapon.”
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on social media on Saturday that the loss of the two U.S. soldiers would stiffen American resolve.
Bij 12. US greenlights Saudi nuclear enrichment without safeguards: Report
Middle East Eye, 20 juli 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-greenlights-saudi-nuclear-enrichment-without-safeguards-report
The Trump administration has greenlit Saudi Arabia’s nuclear enrichment project, but with no safeguards in place to prevent the development of a bomb, CNN reported on Friday.
The draft deal, viewed by the news outlet, showed Washington’s support for Riyadh’s civilian nuclear programme is still awaiting President Donald Trump’s signature, despite US-Saudi negotiations concluding in October.
Unnamed officials cited in the story indicated that the documents, which include the mandatory “123 agreement” and safeguards protocols, have not yet been sent to Congress, potentially for fear of bipartisan pushback.
It is unclear how long the president will wait, given Congress is likely to switch hands to a Democratic majority after the November elections, stymying his policy agenda.
Bovenkant formulier
Onderkant formulier
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his advisors have long pushed for a deal that would allow them to enrich uranium, which they say the kingdom holds vast reserves of.
“We will enrich it and we will sell it and we will do a ‘yellowcake’,” Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said last year, referring to a step in the process that comes after mining but before enrichment.
Nuclear umbrella
The Saudi push to be included under the US’s nuclear umbrella was a key issue during the Saudi crown prince’s visit to the White House in November last year.
Days after Israel attacked Hamas negotiators in Qatar earlier in the year, Saudi Arabia signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world.
Pakistan is estimated to possess around 170 nuclear warheads. Saudi and Pakistani descriptions of the deal said it encompassed all military options.
The Americans’ nuclear talks with Saudi Arabia have been kept under tight wraps, but one former US intelligence official previously told Middle East Eye that the idea of extending protection to the kingdom could serve a purpose.
“It would pull them out of the Pakistanis’ nuclear umbrella and make the Saudis feel better than the Qataris,” he said at the time.
In February, the Trump administration notified Congress it is pursuing a civil nuclear pact with Riyadh that does not include non-proliferation safeguards it has traditionally imposed on countries to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons.
The language in the document also leaves room for Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium, as it stipulates “additional safeguards and verification measures to the most sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation” between the two countries, including enrichment and reprocessing, the report said.
A nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia that does not explicitly prohibit the kingdom’s potential to enrich uranium in the future would be much more transformative for the region than a separate deal for F-35 warplanes that the Trump administration is pursuing.
In nuclear agreements with foreign governments, for example, the UAE, the US made cooperation conditional on commitments that they will not enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel. The UAE, Morocco and dozens of European and Asian countries have signed the so-called “123 Agreements” with the US.
US law generally requires a 123 Agreement to be in force before licensing significant exports of US-origin nuclear material or equipment to a foreign country.
In addition to a 123 Agreement, US lawmakers have insisted that the US require Saudi Arabia to submit to what is called the “Additional Protocol”, which allows the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) additional access to nuclear facilities, data, and undeclared sites.
The UAE, the only other Gulf state to have officially partnered with the US in nuclear energy, signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA agreement in 2009.
Reuters reported, however, that the Trump administration sent a preliminary report to some heads of congressional committees in November, which it is required to send if it is not pursuing the Additional Protocol.
The Reuters report underscores how Trump is putting deal-making at the centre of his diplomacy, even if it means chafing at the traditional concerns of the US foreign policy establishment.
Bij 13. Der Propaganda trotzen
Junge Welt, 21 juli 2026, https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/526454.personalmangel-bei-der-bundeswehr-der-propaganda-trotzen.html
Tausende verweigern den Kriegsdienst, ein paar hundert aber widerrufen. Derweil findet die Bundeswehr nicht genügend Freiwillige für die »Litauen-Brigade«
Es muss wahrlich schlecht um die Kriegsbereitschaft stehen, wenn selbst solche Zahlen zu Erfolgsmeldungen aufgebauscht werden: Ganze 402 Kriegsdienstverweigerer haben im ersten Halbjahr 2026 ihre Entscheidung zur Verweigerung widerrufen. Das berichtete am Montag das Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland (RND) unter Berufung auf das Bundesamt für Familie und zivilgesellschaftliche Aufgaben (BAFzA). Demnach seien 2023 dort 536 entsprechende Verzichtserklärungen eingegangen, 2024 seien es 626 gewesen, im vergangenen Jahr 781. Bis zum Ende des Jahres rechnet das Amt noch mit einer weiteren Zunahme. Selbst wenn man davon ausgeht, dass im zweiten Halbjahr noch einmal genau so viele Verweigerungen widerrufen werden wie in den ersten sechs Monaten, wären das auch gerademal rund 800 Personen.
Dazu kommt, dass es sich dabei schwerlich um die von der Bundeswehr anvisierte Zielgruppe handelt. Das RND führte in seinem Bericht von Montag zwei Gewährsleute an, wohl um die nötige propagandistische Begleitmusik liefern zu können, ohne selbst Stellung zu beziehen. Der Grünen-Bundestagsabgeordnete Janosch Dahmen, Jahrgang 1981, habe seine Verweigerung zurückgezogen und sich als Reservist gemeldet – wegen »Putin«. Es könne »nicht nur die Aufgabe der anderen sein, unser schützenswertes Land und unsere freie, liberale Gesellschaft zu verteidigen, wenn sie von ihren Feinden angegriffen wird«, hatte Dahmen Mitte Juli dem Spiegel erklärt. Was genau »schützenswert« sein soll in diesem Lande, wurde nicht näher erläutert.
Ebenfalls dürftig waren die »Argumente« der zweiten genannten Person, des Autors und einstigen Bertelsmann-Managers Stephan Anpalagan, Jahrgang 1984. Das RND zitiert aus einem Interview, das Anpalagan vor rund einer Woche der katholischen Nachrichtenplattform aus.sicht gegeben hatte, wohl um sein neues Buch mit dem Titel »Für den Frieden – Widerruf meiner Kriegsdienstverweigerung« zu bewerben. In dem Gespräch finden sich Sätze wie dieser: »Wenn es einen Völkermord gibt, kommen wir irgendwann mit Reden nicht mehr weiter. Dann braucht es eine militärische Antwort.« Damit meint Anpalagan nicht etwa eine militärische Intervention gegen Israel, um endlich das Morden in Palästina zu stoppen, sondern – wie kann es anders sein – Russlands »Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine«.
Zudem sei sein Vater dement, weshalb er sich gefragt habe: »Was passiert dann mit all den Menschen, die nicht fliehen können, mit den Alten und Kranken – und mit meinem Vater?« Es müsse Menschen geben, die sie verteidigen. So sei sein Wunsch gewachsen, »für Frieden zu kämpfen«. Und weiter: »Pazifismus kann nicht bedeuten, dass wir einem Volk wie der Ukraine, das angegriffen wird, nicht beistehen. Denn zum Kern des Christentums gehören Solidarität, Empathie und Nächstenliebe.« Waffenlieferungen an ukrainische Nazibataillone sind mit dem Christentum offenbar nicht unvereinbar.
Vergangene Woche noch hatte das RND unter Berufung auf das BAFzA berichtet, dass die Anzahl der Anträge auf Kriegsdienstverweigerung in den vergangenen Jahren stark gestiegen sei: von rund 3.000 im Jahre 2024 auf fast 6.000 allein im ersten Halbjahr 2026. Der Welt am Sonntag konnte man zudem entnehmen, dass die Bundeswehr nicht einmal 5.000 Freiwillige für die »Ostflanke« findet – noch immer fehlen rund 2.000 Soldaten für den Aufbau der »Litauen-Brigade«, ein Leuchtturmprojekt von Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius (SPD). Manche Einheiten würden weniger als 30 Prozent ihres vorgesehenen Personalumfangs erreichen, zahlreiche weitere weniger als 50 Prozent. Und von 6.000 Dienstposten beim sogenannten Heimatschutz sind laut RND von vergangener Woche rund 1.000 nach wie vor nicht besetzt. Dabei soll die im April 2025 aufgestellte »Heimatschutzdivision« ihrem Kommandeur Andreas Henne zufolge »bis 2035 auf weit über 10.000 Soldaten wachsen«, wie es am Montag hieß.
Der Unwille, in einem künftigen Krieg gegen Russland die Schützengräben (und Massengräber) zu füllen, scheint in der Bevölkerung also nach wie vor stärker ausgeprägt zu sein als die Bereitschaft dazu – trotz propagandistischer Dauerbearbeitung.
Bij 14. Tussen afschrikking en maatschappelijke weerbaarheid
PAX.nl, 20 juli 2026 https://paxvoorvrede.nl/publicaties/tussen-afschrikking-en-maatschappelijke-weerbaarheid/ (zie de link om de hele reactie te downloaden)
Gezamenlijke reactie op internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Nederlandse overheid
De recent gepubliceerde Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie, de Hoofdlijnenbrief Buitenlandse Zaken en de Defensienota markeren een fundamentele koerswijziging in het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid. Waar eerdere beleidsdocumenten veiligheid benaderden vanuit de samenhang tussen militaire, economische en menselijke veiligheid, kiest de nieuwe strategie nadrukkelijk voor geopolitieke concurrentie, militaire afschrikking en Europese strategische autonomie als uitgangspunt.
Deze gezamenlijke reactie van Nederlandse maatschappelijke organisaties die zich bezighouden met vrede, conflictpreventie en ontwikkeling analyseert de nieuwe koers in het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid en pleit voor een werkelijk alomvattende benadering van veiligheid, met concrete beleidsaanbevelingen.
Dit document is opgesteld door PAX, samen met CARE Nederland, Cordaid, Mensen met een Missie, WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform en Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS).
Guido van Leemput
