- Oekraïne heeft vredesvoorstellen aan Amerikaanse onderhandelaars gestuurd
De Oekraïense president Zelensky meldt dat er vredesvoorstellen zijn opgesteld. Deze plannen worden aan het vaste Amerikaanse onderhandelaarsteam voorgelegd. Zij gaan binnenkort naar Rusland. Zelensky meldde dat hij de oorlog snel wil beëindigen. Zie 5.
Ondertussen gaan de wederzijdse bombardementen door. Rusland meldt dat honderden Oekraïense drones aanvallen op havens hebben uitgevoerd. Zie 6.
De Amerikaanse vice-president Vance heeft eind juli met Zelensky gebeld met het zeer dringende verzoek om geen schepen met olie uit Kazakstan aan te vallen. Dat raakt nl rechtstreeks de Amerikaanse oliemaatschappijen Chevron en Exxon, die nogal grote investeringen in de Kazakstaanse olie-industrie hebben gepleegd. Aldus geschiedde. Maar Patriot luchtafweer is nog niet binnen voor Oekraïne. Zie 8.
In de Oekraïense pers een hele analyse over de aanpassingen in de Russische rakettenbouw. De S-400 en S-300 luchtafweer zijn omgebouwd tot aanvalswapens. Bijvoorbeeld. Zie 7.
Turkije beweert dat de hele verstoppershow in de catering-container van president Trump het gevolg was van maatregelen nadat een bericht uit Israël binnenkwam dat Iran Trump wilde raken. Turkije is ervan overtuigd dat het een Israëlisch nep-bericht was. Om de onderhandelingen van de VS met Iran te torpederen. Zie 9.
The Economist heeft uitgerekend hoe lang Iran de Straat van Hormoez nog als effectief economisch wapen kan gebruiken. Heel lang. Zie 10.
In Duitsland is in december vorig jaar al een drone-bestrijdingseenheid van de politie opgericht. Deze wordt nu na de paniek op het vliegveld van Leipzig uitgebreid. Bovendien onstaat er een discussie of dit nu een taak voor de politie (binnenlandse dreiging) of het leger (buitenlandse dreiging). En of de grondwet moet worden veranderd. Zie 11.
In de Cannerberg in Maastricht neemt de toeristische belangstelling voor de oude NAVO-taken uit de Koude Oorlog massale vormen aan. Allen daarheen. Zie 12.
Zoekt u mee naar ‘een toekomstbestendige totaaloplossing rond voeding, verpakking en logistiek’. Dat ligt hier een ‘unieke challenge’ om iedereen rantsoenbonnen te bezorgen voor als het nodig is. Zie 13.
De ontwikkelingen van 11 augustus 2026 aan het front in Oekraïne volgens het ISW via de link https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/. Dit zijn hun hoofdconclusies:
- Russian forces conducted another combined ballistic/quasi-ballistic missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 11, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities.
- Russian forces are likely launching small numbers of North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles in nightly strike packages in an attempt to battle-test the missiles and improve their accuracy.
- Russia may be preparing to base North Korean missileers and ballistic missiles at a training center currently under construction in Voronezh Oblast.
- The Russian Supreme Court disqualified the Russian opposition party Yabloko from the September 2026 State Duma elections, likely in order to prevent Russians from having the option to support the party’s anti-war platform.
- Yabloko’s exclusion from the upcoming Duma elections represents a further consolidation of the Russian political system around the war in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin likely also aims to reduce the risk of the ruling United Russia party not achieving the Kremlin’s desired outcome in the upcoming elections.
- The Kremlin was permissive of Yabloko in earlier years of the war, but the growing persecution of the party and its eventual disqualification show how its priorities have shifted.
- Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaigns against Wildberries warehouses and oil refineries in Russia.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 11.
- Herhaalbericht. Kom maandag 24 augustus om 18 uur naar het Spui Amsterdam voor het 92e vredesprotest!
Met sprekers, dichters, muziek en twee minuten stilte protesteren we maandag 24 augustus van 18.00 tot 19.00 uur opnieuw op het Spui in Amsterdam tegen het bloedvergieten, bombardementen op civiele en militaire installaties en onophoudelijk sterven in de loopgraven. Al meteen na de brute overval van Rusland op Oekraïne op 24 februari 2022 riepen wij onze Europese leiders op om in actie te komen en met onderhandelingen en diplomatie zo snel mogelijk een einde te maken aan het zinloze sterven en lijden. Ruim vier jaar later organiseren we dit protest voor de 92e keer.
Zie verder https://www.stopdeoorlogamsterdam.nl/
- Herhaalbericht. Stop de oorlogskoorts
Zondag 27 september 2026, 13:00, De Dam, Amsterdam. Nationaal vredesprotest.
- Stop de militarisering en de sociale afbraak; 2. Geen steun voor Amerikaanse en Israëlische agressieoorlogen, oorlogsmisdaden en genocide; 3. Vrede in Europa;
Voor een onafhankelijke Nederlandse vredespolitiek.
Wij eisen een radicale koerswijziging: weg van militarisering en escalatie, en richting vrede, diplomatie, sociale veiligheid en een onafhankelijke Nederlandse vredespolitiek. Zie verder voor veel meer; https://www.stopdeoorlogskoorts.nl/
- The 2026 Global Peace Index (GPI)
‘The 2026 Global Peace Index (GPI) finds that the world has continued its longstanding trajectory of deteriorating peacefulness, with armed conflict the dominant driver of the decline. There are now more active state-based conflicts than at any point since the end of the Second World War, while the number of countries involved in external conflict has nearly doubled since 2008. World military expenditure has risen for the 10th consecutive year. Zie de link naar het zeer gedetaillieerde rapport van ruim 115 bladzijden via https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Global-Peace-Index-2026-Report.pdf
- Zelenskyy says Ukraine has sent proposals to US to end war with Russia
Al Jazeera, 12 augustus 2026, ‘Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that Kyiv has handed the United States new proposals aimed at ending the four-and-a-half-year war with Russia. The announcement on Tuesday came amid suggestions by both Ukraine and Russia that US negotiators would soon pay a visit to their two countries.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/zelenskyy-says-ukraine-has-sent-proposals-to-us-to-end-war-with-russia.
- Russian authorities report “hundreds of drones” attacking Krasnodar Krai, fires at port and naval harbour – photos, video
Ukrainska Pravda English, 12 augustus 2026, ‘Russian authorities have reported a large-scale drone attack on Krasnodar Krai, while Telegram channels have said fires are burning at the port, an oil terminal and the naval harbour in Novorossiysk.’ Zie de bijlage en voor foto’s en beelden zeker https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/12/8048329/.
- Kyiv under S-400 fire: how Russia has turned air defence missiles into a weapon of terror and why they keep coming
Ukrainska Pravda, 9 augustus 2026, ‘Russia attacked Ukraine with 24 ballistic missiles on the night of 4-5 August, which the Ukrainian Air Force grouped under the combined Iskander-M/S-400 designation. Kyiv Oblast bore the brunt of the strike. With Patriot interceptor stocks running low, Ukrainian air defences were unable to bring down a single missile.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/08/09/8047980/.
- JD Vance asked Ukraine to halt strikes on tankers using Russian port
Financial Times, 12 augustus 2026, ‘Washington alarmed by Kyiv’s campaign on vessels collecting Kazakh oil from Novorossiysk. Ukraine has halted an intense campaign of drone strikes on oil tankers using a critical Black Sea port after a request at the end of last month from US vice-president JD Vance, according to Ukrainian officials.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://archive.ph/Ez0wN.
- Turkey suspects Israel fabricated Trump Air Force One assassination plot to derail US-Iran deal
Middle East Eye, 11 August 2026, ‘Turkish officials suspect that an Israeli intelligence report that said Iran planned to assassinate US President Donald Trump during the Ankara Nato summit last month was a ruse to undermine negotiations with Tehran. Israeli intelligence had warned that Iranian operatives could target Trump’s plane with shoulder-fired missiles during the Nato summit in Ankara amid tense negotiations with Tehran.’ Zie de bijlage of https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-suspects-israel-fabricated-trump-air-force-one-assassination-plot-derail-us-iran-deal.
- How long can Iran weaponise Hormuz?
The Economist, 3 augustus 2026, ‘For years the world has feared that Iran has been pursuing nuclear arms. Five months of war have taught the country’s rulers they were already in possession of another formidable weapon. Geography and firepower give them de facto command of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (lng) normally flows. Choking that artery gives Iran’s leaders immense leverage over their adversaries.’ Zie verder de bijlage https://archive.ph/P8PUw (zie ook Iran holds firm on Hormuz conditions as Pakistan’s Naqvi visits Tehran, Al Jazeera, 12 augustus 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/iran-holds-firm-on-hormuz-conditions-as-pakistans-naqvi-visits-tehran).
- Drohnenabwehreinheit der Bundespolizei wird deutlich größer
RND.de, 10 augustus 2026, ‘Die Bundespolizei stockt ihre erst im Dezember gegründete Drohnenabwehreinheit drastisch auf: von geplanten 130 auf 300 Spezialkräfte. Grund ist die gestiegene Bedrohung durch professionell umgebaute Drohnen.’ Zie de bijlage of https://www.rnd.de/politik/nach-sprengstoff-drohne-in-leipzig-bundespolizei-verdoppelt-groesse-der-abwehreinheit-AFRHMHWLWRFRTPHSFNLAR3PETA.html.
- Onrust in de wereld zorgt voor drukte bij oud NAVO-hoofdkwartier Maastricht
L1.nl, 11 augustus 2026, ‘Rondleidingen in het voormalige NAVO-hoofdkwartier in de Cannerberg bij Maastricht zijn al de hele zomer vol. Explore Maastricht voegt extra rondleidingen toe in het weekend.’ Zie de bijlage of https://www.l1nieuws.nl/nieuws/3219101/onrust-in-de-wereld-zorgt-voor-drukte-bij-oud-navo-hoofdkwartier-maastricht.
- Nieuwe fase voor rantsoenenchallenge Defensie
DIT-Noord.nl, 11 augustus 2026, ‘Defensie zoekt samen met marktpartijen en kennisinstellingen naar een toekomstbestendige totaaloplossing rond voeding, verpakking en logistiek. Ook bedrijven die niet bij de eerste bijeenkomst aanwezig waren, kunnen nog aansluiten.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://www.dit-noord.nl/nieuws/nieuwe-fase-voor-rantsoenenchallenge-defensie/.
Colofon:
Vredespolitiek verschijnt elke werkdag en wordt samengesteld door Guido van Leemput met dagelijkse medewerking van Kees Kalkman en diverse los-vaste tipgevers.
Voor meer berichten, met name over bewapening, als deze zie ook Vredessite.nl; https://vredessite.nl/index.php.
Bij 5. Zelenskyy says Ukraine has sent proposals to US to end war with Russia
Al Jazeera, 12 augustus 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/zelenskyy-says-ukraine-has-sent-proposals-to-us-to-end-war-with-russia
Ukrainian president also says Russia will use its parliamentary election next month as a pretext to declare a new mobilisation.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that Kyiv has handed the United States new proposals aimed at ending the four-and-a-half-year war with Russia. The announcement on Tuesday came amid suggestions by both Ukraine and Russia that US negotiators would soon pay a visit to their two countries. “We have conveyed our proposals to the American side,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address.
He said the US could help strengthen Ukraine’s defences, particularly its air defences, while increasing pressure on Moscow so that Russia prepares “for an end to the war rather than prolonging it”. The Ukrainian leader offered no details on the proposals.
Talks to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began in 2022, have largely stalled since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran. US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were last in Moscow in January and have not yet visited Kyiv.
Ukraine has repeatedly called for a ceasefire after years of fighting. Russia says it wants a settlement, but any solution must involve Ukraine fully ceding four regions Moscow claims as well as resolving the conflict’s “root causes”.
In his address, Zelenskyy also accused Russia of preparing to use its parliamentary elections next month as a pretext for another large-scale military mobilisation. “They are preparing for mobilisation in the autumn, immediately after the imitation of parliamentary elections,” Zelenskyy said, as part of a plan to “create the appearance that Russians supposedly support the war”.
Following the “pseudo-election”, Russian President Vladimir Putin “plans an additional rapid mobilisation of several hundred thousand Russians by the end of the year, plus another similar number next year”, he added.
Officials in Moscow, however, have previously denied that another mobilisation is necessary.
Separately on Tuesday, US President Donald Trump announced that Russia has released former US Marine Robert Gilman after four years in detention. Trump said Putin agreed to free the 32-year-old “on a humanitarian basis” and that Washington released no prisoners in return. Gilman was expected to arrive at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, DC, on Tuesday night. The US had been pressing Moscow to release Gilman so he could receive medical treatment. US officials said he would be evaluated by doctors during the flight before being transferred to a rehabilitation centre in San Antonio, Texas.
Gilman was detained in Russia in January 2022 after an alleged altercation with a police officer and was later designated by Washington as wrongfully detained.
Bij 6. Russian authorities report “hundreds of drones” attacking Krasnodar Krai, fires at port and naval harbour – photos, video
Ukrainska Pravda English, 12 August, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/12/8048329/
Russian authorities have reported a large-scale drone attack on Krasnodar Krai, while Telegram channels have said fires are burning at the port, an oil terminal and the naval harbour in Novorossiysk.
Source: Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev; Krymsky Veter (Crimean Wind) and Exilenova+ Telegram channels; NASA’s FIRMS fire and thermal anomalies map
Quote from Kondratyev: “Krasnodar Krai spent the entire night repelling a large-scale attack involving several hundred Ukrainian Armed Forces drones.”
Details: Kondratyev said Novorossiysk, Anapa, Gelendzhik and the Temryuk district had come under attack.
Bij 7. Kyiv under S-400 fire: how Russia has turned air defence missiles into a weapon of terror and why they keep coming
Ukrainska Pravda, 9 augustus 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/08/09/8047980/
Russia attacked Ukraine with 24 ballistic missiles on the night of 4-5 August, which the Ukrainian Air Force grouped under the combined Iskander-M/S-400 designation. Kyiv Oblast bore the brunt of the strike. With Patriot interceptor stocks running low, Ukrainian air defences were unable to bring down a single missile.
What makes the S-400 particularly notable is that it was designed as an air defence system to intercept incoming missiles, not to strike ground targets. It has nevertheless been repurposed by Russia, which has ramped up production, extended its range to Kyiv, and significantly expanded its strike capabilities.
How an anti-aircraft missile becomes a short-range ballistic missile
This is not the first time Russia has used air defence missiles to strike ground targets. In 2022, it employed older S-300 surface-to-air missiles against towns and cities near the front line.
Subsequent reports confirmed the use of the newer 48N6 missiles, compatible with later variants of the S-300 and the S-400. In 2026, Russia added the RM-48U to its arsenal, mass-producing the missile by converting decommissioned surface-to-air missiles. According to Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Russia manufactured 200 RM-48Us in 2025 and intends to produce more than 480 in 2026. 8N6 surface-to-air missiles for the S-400 system being loaded into transport and launch containers at a factory.
Russia has turned the ad hoc use of surface-to-air missiles into a stand-alone production effort that enables it to supplement Iskander short-range ballistic missiles during combined attacks. The result is a greater number of high-speed weapons per strike, despite their inferior accuracy and destructive power compared with purpose-built ballistic missiles. the missile variants employed by Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defence systems
The names S-300 and S-400 are commonly used as shorthand for missiles, although they actually refer to families of air defence systems comprising radars, command posts, launchers and several missile types. Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms exporter, lists four missile variants for the S-400 alone: the 48N6E3, 48N6E2, 40N6E and 9M96E2. As a result, recovering a piece of wreckage from a 48N6 missile is not always enough to determine which specific air defence system launched it, as these missiles are often compatible with both later variants of the S-300 and the newer S-400. A 48N6DM anti-aircraft missile being launched from an S-400 system
The oldest missile relevant to this story, the 5V55R, weighs around 1.66 tonnes and carries a high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing about 130 kg. Its standard engagement range against aerial targets is up to 75 km. The newer 48N6 weighs around 1.8 tonnes and, depending on the variant, carries a warhead weighing between 143 and 180 kg, according to various reference sources.
Both missiles were designed primarily to destroy aircraft and incoming missiles in flight. Their warheads generate a large volume of fragmentation but lack the specialised penetrators or reinforced casings needed to breach concrete or underground structures. As a result, they are less effective than purpose-built surface-to-surface missiles against hardened point targets. Yet in urban areas, that limitation matters little. Travelling at high speed, the missile’s mass and the spread of thousands of fragments can devastate a wide area even with a relatively modest warhead.
The 40N6 stands apart as the S-400’s longest-range missile, with a claimed engagement range of up to 380-400 km against aerial targets. In November 2023, Ukrainian officials reported finding debris from a 40N6 on the Zaporizhzhia front. However, the presence of missile debris alone does not prove it was launched against a ground target rather than fired by Russian air defence units. Nor is there any public evidence that the 40N6 has been used systematically in ground-attack roles. Likewise, its maximum engagement range against aircraft should not be confused with its potential range in ground strikes, as the missile follows a different flight profile and relies on different guidance methods.
The S-300’s ground-attack capability predates the full-scale invasion. In May 2011, three Russian air defence missile regiments carried out exercises at the Telemba training range, firing five combat missiles from a stationary S-300 system at ground targets. The Russian military claimed that all five had hit their targets. Results achieved on a test range, where target coordinates are known in advance, cannot be directly compared with long-range strikes under combat conditions. They do, however, confirm that the capability existed and had been practised.
The exact guidance algorithms used for ground attacks for all missile variants remain classified. The available technical information indicates that they employ inertial and radio-command guidance during the initial stages of flight. Once the missile passes beyond the radio horizon, however, guidance from the ground radar is no longer possible, and it continues towards the target using inertial navigation alone. This mechanism enabled the 48N6DM to cover more than 200 km in a strike on Kyiv, but it also explains why these missiles sacrifice accuracy for speed over long distances.
For this reason, describing these weapons as ballistic missiles comes with an important caveat. Neither the 5V55 nor the 48N6 is a true equivalent of the 9M723 missile used by the Iskander-M system. Instead, each follows a ballistic-like trajectory for much of its flight before descending into the designated target area during the terminal phase. There is no publicly available, verified data on the circular error probable (CEP) of strikes by these missiles, meaning the precise accuracy figures that occasionally appear in the media cannot be independently substantiated.
The absence of reliable accuracy data is particularly relevant when analysing individual strikes. Hitting a target on a test range or a large industrial site does not necessarily prove that the missile can reliably strike a small target at its maximum range. The longer it flies without radio correction, the further its performance diverges from that of a dedicated precision-guided munition.
Travelling at extremely high speed, the 48N6DM gives defenders only minutes to react. Ukrainian estimates put its top speed at about 2.5 km/s, which means it can cover 200 km in just a few minutes. During an attack on Kyiv Oblast in January 2023, the early warning system was not always able to issue timely alerts. The issue was not that the missile could not be detected, but that its short flight time left little time to determine whether an S-300 or S-400 launch was directed at an aerial or ground target.
Geography of the strikes: from Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia to Kharkiv
During 2022 and 2023, S-300 missiles were used primarily against regions close to the front line or the Russian border. Among the most devastating was the attack on a humanitarian convoy in Zaporizhzhia on 30 September 2022. Russia fired 16 S-300 missiles on the city and its outskirts, four of which hit the area around a car market and a convoy of civilian vehicles. The strike killed 32 people and injured 118 others.
Further south, Mykolaiv also came under S-300 attack. On 23 October 2022, a Russian missile struck a five-storey residential block. No fatalities were reported.
On 14 April 2023, Russia struck Sloviansk with eight S-300 missiles. Residential buildings, offices and commercial premises were damaged. The attack claimed 15 lives and injured 24 people, according to the final toll after search-and-rescue operations ended.
On the evening of 21 October 2023, two missiles struck a postal hub operated by Nova Poshta (Nova Post), Ukraine’s largest private delivery company, in Novyi Korotych, near Kharkiv. Citing early reports, the prosecutor’s office identified them as S-300 missiles launched from Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. Bomb disposal experts recovered debris at the scene consistent with that assessment. Eight people were killed and 15 were injured.
These incidents demonstrate the key advantage of this type of weapon for Russia: the launchers are positioned close to the battlefield, enabling missiles to reach cities such as Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Sloviansk in a matter of minutes and leaving less time for warning systems to react.
When the S-400 reached Kyiv
On the morning of 14 January 2023, the Ukrainian command reported that S-400 missiles fired from the north had struck Kyiv. Photographs of missile debris showed markings that allowed experts to identify it as a 48N6DM. Russia’s Bryansk Oblast was named as the likely launch area, although the exact coordinates and final conclusions of the expert analysis were not made public. This makes it more accurate to refer to the finding as a credible Ukrainian assessment rather than definitive confirmation.
The newer 48N6DM can travel significantly further than the older 5V55 and carries a heavier warhead. However, the S-400’s maximum advertised range of 400 km should not be interpreted as the ability of all its missiles to accurately hit ground targets at that distance, as that figure primarily refers to the 40N6 missile’s claimed performance against aerial targets. Regarding the Kyiv attack, Ukrainian experts attributed the strike to a 48N6DM missile that had covered more than 200 km.
In the summer of 2026, S-400 missiles are once again appearing regularly in Ukrainian reports alongside Iskander missiles. On 2 July, the Ukrainian Air Force recorded 24 missiles in the combined Iskander-M/S-400 category, four of which were intercepted. On 6 July, 23 missiles were recorded, but no interceptions of ballistic assets were reported. On 1 August, one of the 27 missiles in this category was shot down. On 5 August, none of the 24 missiles was intercepted. All four attacks were directed primarily at Kyiv or Kyiv Oblast. Based on publicly available data, it is impossible to determine what proportion of these missiles were S-400s.
Bomb disposal experts from Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs examining debris from an S-400 surface-to-air missile that either failed to detonate or was intercepted on 14 July 2026
Photo: Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs
The Russian attack on 14 July provided further physical evidence of S-400 use. A warhead and debris from an S-400 missile were found in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district. Since the exact variant was not determined, the evidence confirms the system’s involvement but does not allow the missile to be definitively identified as either the 48N6DM or the 40N6.
The low interception rate during these attacks is a result of the missiles’ flight profile, high speed and the limited number of systems capable of engaging them. Russia is taking advantage of Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptors and increasing its use of ballistic missile strikes. Defending against these threats requires Patriot or similar systems, such as the SAMP/T, which Ukraine also operates. The result is a costly imbalance: even a missile with limited accuracy can force Ukraine to choose between exposing a critical infrastructure facility to destruction or using a valuable anti-missile interceptor.
RM-48U: from the disposal of old missiles to a mass-produced weapon
Debris identified as RM-48U was publicly shown in Ukraine for the first time after the combined attack on 20 January 2026. The missile is a refurbished dummy based on older 5V55 or 48N6 missiles withdrawn from service. It is compatible with S-300 and S-400 launch systems.
It was initially unclear whether the missile in question had been equipped with a conventional warhead or was being used as a decoy. In January, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine described RM-48Us in a report on the cost of the latest Russian attack as training missiles. By June, the same type was listed in intelligence data as the RM-48U missile designed for ground targets. This indicates that different variants or employment methods may exist within the same missile family.
The extent of the RM-48U programme became apparent only in 2026. Defence Intelligence of Ukraine reported that Russia had produced more than 200 RM-48U missiles in 2025, aims to produce over 480 in 2026 and has reached a production rate of up to 50 per month. As a result, the first publicly identified debris in January should not be interpreted as the missile’s first deployment. It was merely the first case where its use could be tied to a clearly identified designation.
These figures change the perception of the RM-48U as a one-off effort to dispose of obsolete missiles. Instead, they point to a specialised production line that enables Russia to convert decommissioned surface-to-air missiles into offensive weapons or decoys. The RM-48U cannot match the Iskander in precision, destructive power or ability to defeat fortified targets. Instead, it adds more fast-moving assets to Russian attacks, further complicating Ukraine’s early warning and missile defence efforts.
For air defence units, the difference between a live missile and a decoy becomes apparent too late. A high-speed target cannot simply be ignored on the assumption that it may not carry a warhead. It must still be tracked by radar, its trajectory assessed and a decision made on whether to launch an interceptor. This is precisely why the RM-48U retains military value even in its decoy configuration.
Not a replacement for the Iskander, but a second echelon of attack
For Russia, converting S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles into ground-attack weapons is a practical solution. It enables Moscow to tap into vast Soviet-era stockpiles, including missiles nearing the end of their service life, and takes advantage of launchers already deployed near Ukraine. The RM-48U programme expands on this approach by establishing a structured method for refurbishing decommissioned missiles. As Soviet-era reserves gradually diminish, developing new anti-aircraft missiles requires considerable investment and lengthy production cycles.
However, this is not a cost-free replacement for purpose-built ballistic missiles. The 5V55 and 48N6 have smaller warheads, limited ability to penetrate hardened structures and lower demonstrated accuracy against ground targets. Their use also draws on Russia’s air defence reserves. Their advantage is distinct: they pose a fast, additional threat that can increase the number of missiles in a single attack and complicate Ukrainian interception efforts, as they require a different response than that used against drones or cruise missiles.
Ukraine’s response cannot be limited to expanding its missile defence arsenal. Patriot and SAMP/T systems depend on a steady supply of scarce interceptors. Other measures are equally important: improving launch detection, providing earlier warnings, dispersing personnel and critical industrial facilities, and targeting launchers, radars and production sites linked to Russia’s missile programme. The RM-48U’s mass production indicates that this threat will persist even as Soviet-era 5V55 stocks decline. Russia is moving from using accumulated reserves towards maintaining a dedicated capability to produce and deploy new weapons.
Bij 8. JD Vance asked Ukraine to halt strikes on tankers using Russian port
Financial Times, 12 augustus 2026, https://archive.ph/Ez0wN
Washington alarmed by Kyiv’s campaign on vessels collecting Kazakh oil from Novorossiysk
Ukraine has halted an intense campaign of drone strikes on oil tankers using a critical Black Sea port after a request at the end of last month from US vice-president JD Vance, according to Ukrainian officials.
Washington was alarmed that Ukraine was further destabilising oil markets and harming US companies by targeting tankers carrying crude piped from Kazakhstan to a Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal in the Russian port of Novorossiysk.
Vance asked President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to halt the attacks during a call on July 31, the Ukrainian officials and other people familiar with the matter said.
Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal since then, according to the officials and FT analysis of open-source information.
It had agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or non-Russian vessels as long as those ships were not under Ukrainian sanctions and were not carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo, the officials said.
“We very carefully listen to our American partners,” a senior Ukrainian official said, adding that Kyiv has established relevant “mechanisms” in response to the US request. The CPC had been “a regular part of the conversation with the US and the Kazakh governments”, the person said.
US energy majors Chevron and ExxonMobil both own stakes in CPC, which is Kazakhstan’s main oil export route, and in the western Kazakh oilfields that service it. Chevron owns 50 per cent of Tengiz, the country’s largest field, while Exxon owns 25 per cent.
A US official confirmed that the administration had warned Ukraine to stop targeting non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea, as well as CPC infrastructure.
“The administration views the CPC as a vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets that serves as an alternative to Russian energy supplies,” the official said.
The US had “reaffirmed” Kyiv’s commitment to refrain from targeting CPC infrastructure and non-Russian vessels bound for the pipeline’s terminal at Novorossiysk, provided they were not otherwise subject to Ukrainian sanctions, the official added.
Vance’s office, Zelenskyy’s office and the Kazakh foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. CPC, Chevron and Exxon declined to comment.
Vance’s request is not the first time US officials have sought to deter Ukraine from hitting American business interests in Russia.
In February, Olha Stefanishyna, then Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington, said that she had received a démarche — a diplomatic message intended to register disapproval — from the US state department, following a Ukrainian drone strike on Novorossiysk port late last year.
Ukraine’s attacks on the CPC terminal last month — alongside an intense campaign on Russian shipping in the Sea of Azov — caused chaos, repeatedly forcing Kazakhstan to stop piping oil to Novorossiysk and more than doubling shipping rates and insurance.
As a result, CPC loaded just 1.3mn barrels a day in July, down more than 300,000 b/d from the previous month and 600,000 b/d fewer than in May, according to Kpler, which tracks energy flows.
Kazakh crude has become particularly important to global markets as Middle Eastern supplies remain constrained by the Iran war.
Last month, Chevron chief executive Mike Wirth said the company was working with the US and other governments to ensure the “pipeline stays flowing”.
Ukraine’s attacks were part of a long-range drone campaign on oil infrastructure aimed at bringing the war to Russia and cutting off revenues that fund the Kremlin’s continuing invasion.
Vance has been among the most influential, and at times contentious, figures in the Trump administration’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine war, notoriously reprimanding Zelenskyy during their first Oval Office meeting in February 2025.
Earlier this year, Vance said halting military assistance to Kyiv was “one of the things I’m proudest that we’ve done as an administration”.
A person familiar with Ukraine’s position said Kyiv agreed to the Trump administration’s request because it was seeking a US licence to produce Patriot interceptor missiles. It also hopes to buy several hundred of them before the winter, when Russia is expected to intensify its aerial assaults on critical infrastructure.
Zelenskyy told Vance during the July 31 call that Patriots and air defence were Kyiv’s “top priority”, the Ukrainian president’s office said.
Ukraine has accelerated its campaign against Russian energy infrastructure elsewhere, hitting three refineries deep inside the country this month. The strikes have taken a large slice of Russia’s refining capacity offline, forcing it to suspend exports of fuel and putting pressure on global prices of diesel and petrol.
Bij 9. Turkey suspects Israel fabricated Trump Air Force One assassination plot to derail US-Iran deal
Middle East Eye, 11 August 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-suspects-israel-fabricated-trump-air-force-one-assassination-plot-derail-us-iran-deal
Israeli intelligence had warned that Iranian operatives could target Trump’s plane with shoulder-fired missiles during the Nato summit in Ankara amid tense negotiations with Tehran.
Turkish officials suspect that an Israeli intelligence report that said Iran planned to assassinate US President Donald Trump during the Ankara Nato summit last month was a ruse to undermine negotiations with Tehran, Middle East Eye has learnt.
It was around 2pm on 8 July when journalists heard that Turkish security forces were unusually deploying additional units to Ankara Airport, where Trump’s Air Force One was parked.
Ankara was under lockdown for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) summit on 7-8 July. Roads were blocked, pavements were closed, public servants had been granted a week of administrative leave, and the city was largely deserted.
The Turkish government had even transformed an airbase of the Turkish Air Force, Etimesgut Air Base, officially known as Ankara Airport, for the event, allowing heads of state to reach the summit venue within 10 minutes.
Against the backdrop of these extensive security precautions, US officials told their Turkish counterparts that they had received an intelligence report from Israel suggesting Iran could target Trump.
People familiar with the matter told MEE that the report warned an Iranian covert operations unit could target Trump’s brand-new Air Force One near Ankara Airport.
“Supposedly, the Iranians could target the aircraft from within a one-kilometre radius using shoulder-fired missiles known as Manpads,” one person familiar with the matter told MEE.
Unlike Esenboga Airport, the international airport serving the Turkish capital, Ankara Airport is surrounded by civilian buildings, some of which are as close as 500 metres to the runway. Their proximity prompted Turkish officials to take additional precautions.
The people familiar with the issue added that the US Secret Service wanted to take further protective measures. Officials first moved Trump’s departure from Ankara Airport to Esenboga Airport, where civilian buildings are farther from the perimeter. They then brought back the old Air Force One because it had air defence systems that the new aircraft lacked.
The threat of an Iranian attempt on Trump’s life appeared credible to many US officials, as Iran had reportedly tried to orchestrate such an attack twice before.
In July 2024, Pakistani national Asif Merchant was arrested over an alleged plot to kill US politicians, potentially including Trump. Then, in November 2024, the justice department announced charges against Afghan national Farhad Shakeri, alleging that Iran’s government had instructed him to devise a plan to assassinate Trump. Iran has denied targeting Trump or other American officials.
The Secret Service took the latest report so seriously that, according to The Washington Post, Trump was secretly moved after boarding the old Air Force One. He was reportedly bundled into a catering vehicle and taken to an accompanying US government aircraft, a C-32.
A Turkish official confirmed to MEE that US officials had sought additional landing permits for the C-32 as part of the plan and pushed for last-minute changes, leaving Ankara with the impression that something was amiss.
Yet the Israeli intelligence report arrived at a sensitive moment. Trump was negotiating a deal with Iran to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
During his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump repeatedly said that the war with Iran had ended and expressed hope about the negotiations, a source who attended the meeting told MEE.
That position sharply contradicted the agenda of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was pushing for a resumption of hostilities, including heavier strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure and a new assassination campaign targeting Iranian leaders.
‘No way this report was true’
Turkish officials now say they believe the Israeli intelligence report was probably a ruse by Netanyahu’s government to portray itself as protecting Trump, derail negotiations with Iran and undermine Trump’s apparently close relationship with Erdogan.
During his meeting with the Turkish head of state the day before the alleged assassination plot, Trump also signalled that he was prepared to lift sanctions imposed on Turkey over its 2019 purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile system and to sell F-35 fighter jets to Ankara. Netanyahu also strongly opposes F-35 sales to Ankara, arguing that it would change the balance of power in the region, eroding Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge“.
“Of course, we took the report very seriously and tried to assist our American counterparts as much as possible,” one person familiar with the matter told MEE. “Yet it was very clear to us that there was no way this report was true.”
Although Iranian cells have previously kidnapped or assassinated Iranian dissidents in Turkey, Tehran has never dared to carry out a sophisticated operation there involving anything beyond a simple firearm.
Such an attack would require extensive knowledge of the country, as well as safe houses, covert routes into and out of Ankara, and the transportation of Manpads through numerous roadblocks and security checkpoints ahead of the summit.
An attempt of this kind could also put Turkey on a collision course with Iran, which has managed to maintain relatively stable relations with Ankara since the beginning of the war.
Iranian officials have publicly thanked Turkey several times for not supporting what they described as a Mossad-CIA plot to trigger an insurrection in western Iran with the involvement of armed Iranian Kurdish groups.
An Ankara insider told MEE it was ironic that details of the Secret Service operation to protect Trump had been leaked just a month after the summit. “I guess they need heroes for an attack that never happened and, most likely, was never planned,” the insider said. MEE has reached out to the White House and Israeli foreign ministry for comment.
Bij 10. How long can Iran weaponise Hormuz?
The Economist, 3 augustus 2026, https://archive.ph/P8PUw (zie ook Iran holds firm on Hormuz conditions as Pakistan’s Naqvi visits Tehran, Al Jazeera, 12 augustus 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/iran-holds-firm-on-hormuz-conditions-as-pakistans-naqvi-visits-tehran)
For years the world has feared that Iran has been pursuing nuclear arms. Five months of war have taught the country’s rulers they were already in possession of another formidable weapon. Geography and firepower give them de facto command of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (lng) normally flows. Choking that artery gives Iran’s leaders immense leverage over their adversaries.
Iran’s foes hope Hormuz will prove to be a wasting asset. Shutting Hormuz is “a card you can play once,” said Chris Wright, America’s energy secretary, in May. Gulf states are busily seeking alternative export routes. Tom Barrack, Donald Trump’s envoy to Iraq and Syria, reckons the strait will be “an afterthought in two years”.
The Economist has interviewed experts and analysed data to build a “Hormuz dependency dashboard” to test these claims. It points to three conclusions. First, the staying power of the Iranian threat varies by commodity and country. Second, Iran’s ability to cash in on the strait will diminish but may never vanish. Third, even if the fees Iran can charge fall over time, its strategic leverage will not necessarily fade in step. Indeed, it may deepen as the regime institutionalises its regional influence.
Start with how much Hormuz traffic could simply circumvent it. Some 15m barrels of crude oil crossed the strait daily before the war. That looks easiest to divert. Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline, which avoids the strait by crossing the peninsula to Yanbu on the Red Sea, carried just 1m barrels a day (b/d) for export before the war. Today it is running at its full 7m b/d capacity. Nearly 5m b/d of that is exported; the rest feeds coastal refineries. The United Arab Emirates (uae) has maxed out its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which carries 1.8m b/d, up from 1m b/d before the war. Some 200,000 b/d flows through a smaller, once-idle Iraqi pipeline to Turkey.
That narrows the crude-export deficit to 10m b/d. Now add new pipelines likely to be built as a result of the war (see map via the link). Acquiring land poses no problems in the Gulf’s command-and-control economies, says a lawyer familiar with the subject. The most advanced project, the uae’s, would run parallel to the existing line, adding 1.8m b/d by late 2027.
Iraq aims to raise its pipeline’s capacity to 1m b/d within a year. It also plans a new one to link its southern fields with existing routes to Jordan, Syria and Turkey. Contracts for the 2.5m-b/d project are being awarded: it should be done within four years, says Rahul Choudhary of Rystad Energy, a consultancy. So by 2030 another 5m b/d of crude could bypass Hormuz.
But that still leaves the same amount with no alternative route. And none of these fixes is foolproof. Iraqi projects could be derailed by security risks and cross-border rows. Many dreamed-up pipelines never see the light of day. Tankers leaving Yanbu for Asia usually sail via the Bab al-Mandab strait, where they are vulnerable to attacks by Iran-allied Houthi rebels. Saudi crude could travel via the Suez canal or Egypt’s Sumed pipeline. But even that route may not be safe: on July 29th a drone hit a tanker at Damietta, a port near Suez.
Iran—or its proxies—could attack new infrastructure that it fears depletes Hormuz’s power. Even if a deal is reached, the risk of attacks could still push up insurance and financing costs for such projects.
Rerouting refined products is even harder. Gulf countries shipped nearly 5m b/d of petrol, diesel and other fuels via Hormuz last year. No overland pipeline alternatives exist for these. Saudi Arabia is planning one as part of a 2m-b/d expansion to its east-west corridor. But that is still at an early stage and would need a similar increase in Yanbu’s capacity. Iraq is sending 1,000 lorries of fuel oil to Syria a day, up from ten pre-war, but the route is slow and pricey. Syria has earned $15m-20m in transit receipts from the traffic since the war began. New refineries outside the Gulf would take longer to build than pipelines and cost billions of dollars.
The problem is most acute for lng, exported almost exclusively by Qatar. No lng pipeline is under construction and no feasibility studies have been published. Qatar could lay simpler gas pipes to Oman, but they would need to carry as much gas as Russia’s four-string Nord Stream pipelines were once scheduled to deliver to Europe. More implausible still, Qatar’s entire liquefaction complex would need recreating on the Arabian Sea coast.
There is some room for hope. Most importers can, in time, wean themselves off Hormuz supplies. A few years of high prices could spur an extra 2m-3m b/d from the Americas and beyond. China’s refineries still hold ample spare capacity. lng is riding the fastest expansion in its history. So Iran’s leverage over global prices will weaken before the decade is out.
The same is not true of its hold over its Gulf neighbours—and not just because a sizeable share of their energy exports will still need Hormuz for years. Many also depend on the strait for imports. The Gulf Arab states rely on external suppliers for 95% of their grain, but only Saudi Arabia has decent bulk-handling terminals, and these are not big enough to supply the whole region. Nor is moving lots of grain, iron ore or bauxite overland viable: a single Panamax vessel carries 60,000 tonnes of cereal, enough to fill 2,000 trucks.
One obvious fix would be more regional railways, but these would also be slow and costly to build. Past mining-railway projects in Australia, built across similar terrain, have cost $12m-15m a kilometre. So a Red Sea-to-Qatar line could top $25bn.
The Gulf states have strategic grain stockpiles that typically cover four to six months of demand, but no equivalent for containerised goods such as fresh food, medicines and appliances. The region’s biggest container port, Jebel Ali, which has a capacity for nearly 20m 20-foot equivalent units (teu) a year, sits inside the Gulf. Outside the strait, the largest is Jeddah, which can hold 7.5m teu. It was already running near full tilt before the war, says Alexis Ellender of Kpler, a data firm.
So our analysis suggests that Iran will be able to weaponise Hormuz for some time—and monetise it. Gulf states’ varying exposure may mean they diverge in what they will tolerate to get their ships moving. Qatar has suggested that it could accept temporary fees; others have held a tougher line. But even the hawkish uae has softened: it is starting to trade with Iran again and their diplomats are talking.
On August 5th an Iranian official said the regime had agreed on a transit route with Oman and urged “certain third parties” not to meddle. Assuming this gives Iran control of Hormuz, how much could it make? An Iranian mp claimed in June that the country was collecting $1.5m-2m per vessel transiting the strait. That implies takings of more than $35bn a year, assuming traffic at about 70% of pre-war levels.
That figure is eye-popping—and implausible. Rates set at gunpoint, in a market with nowhere else to go, will not survive a deal allowing near-normal flows to resume. Draft legislation submitted to Iran’s parliament envisages rates based on cargo volume, value and vessel type, with one constraint: the charge must stay below the cost of the next-best alternative.
Gimme, gimme, gimme
Shahin Iraninejad of gssi, a sovereign-risk adviser, points out that another legislative proposal posits an average fee of €3 a tonne in Iranian waters and €2 in international waters. He puts expected future income at a more modest $2bn-3bn a year. As bypass capacity grows, that would drop—but not uniformly. Crude tankers can hope for a bargain soon; oil-product, lng and bulk carriers may face higher fees for years.
Would such revenue flows be durable? As long as charges are predictable, easy to settle and below war-risk premiums, many shippers will probably pay, says Richard Meade of Lloyd’s List, a shipping journal. But that would change if vessels repeatedly cross the strait without paying Iran. A tension emerges: Iran needs peace with America for its fee regime to function. But it will need to keep up attacks on disobedient tankers to ensure the fees are paid—which could make peace hard to maintain.
On the brighter side, Iran might drop its fees faster than it needs to. Its strategic objective, says Mr Meade, appears to be maintaining market participation and reinforcing its role as gatekeeper, rather than maximising revenue. It wants something lasting: a governance system—whether a bilateral framework with Oman, a maritime-services architecture or a permit regime. The ease with which Iran seized its new weapon shocked its foes. Its grip on Hormuz looks set to outlast the war.
Bij 11. Drohnenabwehreinheit der Bundespolizei wird deutlich größer
RND.de, 10 augustus 2026, https://www.rnd.de/politik/nach-sprengstoff-drohne-in-leipzig-bundespolizei-verdoppelt-groesse-der-abwehreinheit-AFRHMHWLWRFRTPHSFNLAR3PETA.html
Die Bundespolizei stockt ihre erst im Dezember gegründete Drohnenabwehreinheit drastisch auf: von geplanten 130 auf 300 Spezialkräfte. Grund ist die gestiegene Bedrohung durch professionell umgebaute Drohnen.
Nach der Entdeckung einer Sprengstoff-Drohne am Flughafen Leipzig/Halle soll die neue Drohnenabwehreinheit der Bundespolizei deutlich größer werden als bisher geplant. Bundesinnenministerin Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) werde eine Weisung an die Bundespolizei geben, wonach die Einheit auf 300 Kräfte anwachsen soll, sagte eine Sprecherin des Ministeriums. Statt vier Standorten seien nunmehr acht Standorte geplant, „um schnell und flexibel bei Bedarf vor Ort zu sein“. Zuerst hatte „Bild“ über die geplante Erweiterung berichtet.
Profis am Werk
Am späten Dienstagabend vergangener Woche war auf dem Flughafen Leipzig/Halle in der Nähe ukrainischer Transportflugzeuge eine mit Sprengstoff und Zünder bestückte Drohne entdeckt worden. Zudem war ein Flugzeug mit einem unbekannten kleineren Flugobjekt kollidiert – möglicherweise einer zweiten Drohne. Die Bundesanwaltschaft ermittelt wegen des Verdachts des versuchten Herbeiführens einer Sprengstoffexplosion und des gefährlichen Eingriffs in den Luftverkehr. Zu Fortschritten bei den Ermittlungen und möglichen Verbindungen zu früheren Operationen mit Bezügen zu Russland äußerte sich die Bundesregierung nicht. Überzeugt ist man in Sicherheitskreisen aber schon jetzt, dass die Drohne von einem Profi mit technischem Sachverstand umgebaut wurde.
Explosion in Leipzig vor zwei Jahren
Im Juli 2024 entzündet sich im DHL-Logistikzentrum in Leipzig ein Luftfrachtpaket. Sicherheitskreise gehen davon aus, dass das Paket im Auftrag Russlands platziert war. Deutschland entging damals vermutlich nur knapp einem Flugzeugabsturz. Es sei einem Zufall zu verdanken, dass das Paket nicht während des Fluges in Brand geraten sei, so der damalige Verfassungsschutz-Präsident Thomas Haldenwang.
Neue Einheit der Bundespolizei existiert erst seit Dezember
Als Reaktion auf die gestiegene Bedrohung – vor allem durch Russland – hat Dobrindt im Dezember 2025 eine neue Einheit in Dienst gestellt, die unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge aufspüren, abfangen und gegebenenfalls auch abschießen soll. Die Kräfte sind an Flughäfen, in der Bundeshauptstadt und bundesweit in der Nähe sicherheitsrelevanter Objekte stationiert, um möglichst rasch am Einsatzort sein zu können.
Ursprünglich bis zu 130 Spezialkräfte geplant
Die neue Einheit werde in der Anfangsphase aus rund 60 Bundespolizisten bestehen und solle rasch auf 130 Spezialkräfte anwachsen, hieß es im Dezember. Sie werde unter anderem KI-gestützte Störsysteme und automatische Abfangdrohnen einsetzen. Außerdem solle die neue Einheit in Amtshilfe die Landespolizeien unterstützen, wenn dies nötig ist, und entsprechende Kapazitäten zur Verfügung stehen.
Bundesregierung sieht rechtlich keinen Handlungsbedarf
Mehrere Politiker hatten zuletzt Gesetzesänderungen für eine effektivere Abwehr der Bedrohung durch Drohnen ins Spiel gebracht. Die Bundesregierung verweist ihrerseits auf bereits umgesetzte Änderungen, etwa im Luftsicherheitsgesetz. Der stellvertretende Regierungssprecher Sebastian Hille sagte, bei der Drohnenabwehr sehe sich die Bundesregierung, was die rechtliche Lage angehe, gut aufgestellt.
Schleswig-Holsteins Ministerpräsident Daniel Günther (CDU) hat sich angesichts der Bedrohungslage durch Drohnen dafür ausgesprochen, dass Bundeswehreinsätze auch im Inneren ermöglicht werden sollten. „Weil man bei Drohnen kaum unterscheiden kann, ob es sich um eine außenpolitische oder innenpolitische Bedrohung handelt. Und deswegen, glaube ich, müssen wir auch über eine Änderung des Grundgesetzes sprechen, und ich hoffe auch, dass wir da zu Ergebnissen kommen“, sagte Günther dem Deutschlandfunk.
Für eine Änderung des Grundgesetzes wäre eine Zweidrittelmehrheit in Bundestag und Bundesrat nötig. Im Nachrichtensender Welt TV sagte der SPD-Außenpolitiker Ralf Stegner: „Sich jetzt über Grundgesetzänderungen zu unterhalten, macht relativ wenig Sinn. Wir haben übrigens gar keine grundgesetzändernde Mehrheit im Augenblick im Bundestag und im Bundesrat.“ Ob es in der Sache vernünftig wäre, darüber könne man streiten.
Ziel des neuen Gemeinsamen Drohnenabwehrzentrums von Bund und Ländern, das Anfang des Jahres die Arbeit aufgenommen hat, ist unter anderem der Austausch von Expertise und ein abgestimmtes Handeln in der Abwehr von Drohnen.
Bij 12. Onrust in de wereld zorgt voor drukte bij oud NAVO-hoofdkwartier Maastricht
L1.nl, 11 augustus 2026, https://www.l1nieuws.nl/nieuws/3219101/onrust-in-de-wereld-zorgt-voor-drukte-bij-oud-navo-hoofdkwartier-maastricht
Rondleidingen in het voormalige NAVO-hoofdkwartier in de Cannerberg bij Maastricht zijn al de hele zomer vol. Explore Maastricht voegt extra rondleidingen toe in het weekend.
De vergeefse poging van de Finse toerist Petri Juhani is typerend voor de groeiende belangstelling naar de wortels van het bondgenootschap. “Mijn vader heeft drie jaar aan het front gevochten tegen de Russen”, zo vertelt Juhani. “We zijn als Finland pas drie jaar geleden lid geworden van de NAVO, na de aanval op Oekraïne. Dat werd hoog tijd.”
Verdediging van West-Europa
Vanuit het NAVO-hoofdkwartier in de Cannerberg werden van 1954 tot 1992 de troepenbewegingen gecoördineerd voor de beveiliging van West-Europa. Het ondergrondse complex met een gangenstelsel van acht kilometer zou het Noordatlantische commandocentrum moeten beveiligen tegen vijandige bommen. “Het is natuurlijk heel actueel”, zo vertelt Marianne Stoop uit Tilburg, die een uur lang gefascineerd luisterde naar anecdotes uit de Koude Oorlog. “Als Nederland en Europa brengen we te weinig in bij de NAVO. Dus ik wil wel zien hoe dat in het verleden is geweest.”
“Fake news” in de vorige eeuw
Gids Ernest van Ophuizen herkent de fascinatie met het verleden. “Iedereen wist dat hier iets zat, maar wat precies was geheim. Er waren in dit ondergrondse complex 400 kantoren, iedere dag gingen hier een paar honderd militairen naar binnen. Dat was ook voer voor speculatie. De gedachten die het meest spectaculair waren, bleven hangen. Zo gaat dat inderdaad. De coördinerende taken van dit commandocentrum zijn overgeheveld naar het NAVO-hoofdkwartier in Brunssum.”
Duitsers wilden raketten bouwen
De kilometerslange tunnels in de Cannerberg ontstonden door de winning van mergel. Het verleidde de Duitsers in de Tweede Wereldoorlog tot plannen om V1-raketten te produceren onder de grond. “Hier waren ze veilig voor de bommenwerpers van de RAF en de US Air Force. Ze hebben een hele fabriek gebouwd, de betonvloeren die hier liggen zijn grotendeels door de Duitsers gestort. Maar tegen de tijd dat ze echt konden produceren, stonden de geallieerden bij Luik”, zo vertelt Ernest van Ophuizen.
Limburgs Landschap draagt taak over
Rondleidingen in het voormalige NAVO-hoofdkwartier werden eerder uitgevoerd door het Limburgs Landschap, eigenaar van het complex. Die organisatie bleek niet aan de grote vraag te kunnen voldoen, waarop de excursies werden overgenomen door Explore Maastricht. “We hebben de frequentie uitgebreid van wekelijkse rondleidingen naar twee excursies per dag in deze zomerperiode, ook in het weekend“, aldus Marsha Thijssen van Explore Maastricht. “We zien daarnaast ook een forse stijging van het aantal groepsboekingen.”
Belangstelling van alle leeftijden
Luuk Boerma is een van de jongste bezoekers die de buitenlucht van 30 graden verruilt voor een uur wandelen in de frisse mergelgangen. “Dit is eigenlijk een verjaardagstrip van een van mijn vrienden. Ik vind het heel erg leuk. Als je ziet wat hier allemaal is gebeurd, van de kalksteengroeve tot de NAVO. Ik wist niet zoveel van dat bondgenootschap, maar het is wel belangrijk dat ze ons beschermen. Dus het was heel leuk.”
Bij 13. Nieuwe fase voor rantsoenenchallenge Defensie
DIT-Noord.nl, 11 augustus 2026, https://www.dit-noord.nl/nieuws/nieuwe-fase-voor-rantsoenenchallenge-defensie/
Defensie zoekt samen met marktpartijen en kennisinstellingen naar een toekomstbestendige totaaloplossing rond voeding, verpakking en logistiek. Ook bedrijven die niet bij de eerste bijeenkomst aanwezig waren, kunnen nog aansluiten.
Van losse oplossingen naar één ecosysteem
Op 3 juli organiseerde Defensie op de Majoor Kootkazerne in Stroe een eerste bijeenkomst rond de ontwikkeling van een toekomstbestendig rantsoenecosysteem. Circa 200 vertegenwoordigers van Defensie, bedrijven en kennisinstellingen namen hieraan deel.
Tijdens de bijeenkomst werd duidelijk dat Defensie niet alleen op zoek is naar nieuwe oplossingen voor voeding. De challenge draait om drie samenhangende onderwerpen: voeding, verpakking en logistiek. Het doel is om via een innovatief inkoopproces uiteindelijk te komen tot één of meerdere consortia waaraan de opdracht kan worden gegund.
Bedrijven kunnen hiervoor zelf de samenwerking zoeken met andere ondernemingen, kennisinstellingen en toeleveranciers. Naar verwachting organiseert Defensie eind september ook een marktplaatsbijeenkomst om geïnteresseerde partijen bij elkaar te brengen.
Vervolgbijeenkomst op 2 september
De volgende stap is de Design sessie Rantsoenen op 2 september 2026. Tijdens deze bijeenkomst wil Defensie de dialoog met marktpartijen en kennispartners verbreden en verdiepen.
Deelnemers werken in teams aan een rantsoenecosysteem dat betrouwbaar functioneert en tegelijkertijd paraat, adaptief, autonoom en snel opschaalbaar is. Daarbij komen onder meer de huidige knelpunten en afhankelijkheden, samenwerking, rolverdeling, leveringszekerheid en bestuurbaarheid aan bod. De teams sluiten de dag af met een pitch van hun voorstellen.
Tijdens de bijeenkomst is daarnaast een kleine beursvloer ingericht, waar organisaties hun producten, diensten en oplossingen kunnen presenteren.
Ook bedrijven en organisaties die niet aanwezig waren bij de eerste bijeenkomst op 3 juli zijn welkom om deel te nemen.
Aanmelden
De Design sessie Rantsoenen vindt plaats op: Datum: 2 september 2026 Tijd: 09.00 tot 16.00 uur Locatie: wordt na sluiting van de aanmeldtermijn bekendgemaakt
Aanmelden kan tot en met vrijdag 21 augustus 2026 via het online aanmeldformulier. Defensie kan het aantal deelnemers per organisatie beperken om de kwaliteit van de bijeenkomst te waarborgen.
Aanvullende informatie over de challenge is beschikbaar via tenderplatform Mercell.
Kansen voor Noord-Nederlandse bedrijven
De rantsoenenchallenge biedt mogelijkheden voor Noord-Nederlandse bedrijven en kennisorganisaties met expertise op het gebied van voeding, verpakking of logistiek. Ook partijen die nog niet eerder bij het traject betrokken waren, kunnen hun interesse kenbaar maken.
Wil je verkennen of jouw organisatie kan bijdragen aan deze challenge of zoek je aansluiting bij mogelijke samenwerkingspartners? Neem dan contact op met Niels Nederpelt van DIT-Noord.
Guido van Leemput
