Het Nieuws Vandaag: 14-08-2026

1. De ontwikkelingen van 13 augustus 2026 aan het front in Oekraïne volgens het ISW via de link https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2026/. Dit zijn hun hoofdconclusies:

1. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Kuril Islands, whose occupation by Russia Japan disputes, for the first time on August 13, likely in response to the more assertive defense policy Japan has recently adopted.
2. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues emphasizing Ukraine’s need for US-produced Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes during the winter 2026/2027.
3. An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in occupied Sevastopol reportedly killed Russian Captain 1st Rank Robert Shageev on August 13.
4. Ukrainian forces conducted a large strike against Russian oil infrastructure and Wildberries facilities in the Bashkortostan Republic on the night of August 12 to 13. Russia launched 133 drones against Ukraine overnight.  
5. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Slovyansk directions.  

 

2. Herhaalbericht Kom maandag 24 augustus om 18 uur naar het Spui Amsterdam voor het 92e vredesprotest!

Met sprekers, dichters, muziek en twee minuten stilte protesteren we maandag 24 augustus van 18.00 tot 19.00 uur opnieuw op het Spui in Amsterdam tegen het bloedvergieten, bombardementen op civiele en militaire installaties en onophoudelijk sterven in de loopgraven.

Al meteen na de brute overval van Rusland op Oekraïne op 24 februari 2022 riepen wij onze Europese leiders op om in actie te komen en met onderhandelingen en diplomatie zo snel mogelijk een einde te maken aan het zinloze sterven en lijden. Ruim vier jaar later organiseren we dit protest voor de 92e keer. Zie verder https://www.stopdeoorlogamsterdam.nl/

 

3. Herhaalbericht. Stop de oorlogskoorts

Zondag 27 september 2026, 13:00, De Dam, Amsterdam. Nationaal vredesprotest.

1. Stop de militarisering en de sociale afbraak; 2. Geen steun voor Amerikaanse en Israëlische agressieoorlogen, oorlogsmisdaden en genocide; 3. Vrede in Europa;

Voor een onafhankelijke Nederlandse vredespolitiek. Wij eisen een radicale koerswijziging: weg van militarisering en escalatie, en richting vrede, diplomatie, sociale veiligheid en een onafhankelijke Nederlandse vredespolitiek. Zie verder voor veel meer; https://www.stopdeoorlogskoorts.nl/

 

4. Weekendtips

Ook de afgelopen week waren er weer zeer veel artikelen die ik niet kon opnemen, vanwege de lengte van het artikel of de lengte van het geheel van de editie. Dit zijn de weekendtips voor deze week, in de vorm van een attendering met link.

a. ‘Full cooperation’: How Tel Aviv University serves Israel’s security state

+972Magazine, Meron Rapoport en Aharon Porath, 30 juli 2026, ‘From Shin Bet recruitment to military training programs, Israel’s defense establishment is becoming increasingly embedded in academic life.’ Zie https://www.972mag.com/tel-aviv-university-security-state/

b. Mutual Delusion

New Left Review, Anatol Lieven, 7 augustus 2026, ‘Hardliners on both sides in the Ukraine war are pursuing a chimaera in the hope of a miracle. Moscow appears to believe that in the near future, the Ukrainian defences that have held the Russian advance to a bloody crawl for years will miraculously collapse, or that the European money and arms that have enabled those defences will suddenly vanish.’ Zie verder https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/mutual-delusion

c. Iran plots to deal Trump a blow in midterms by keeping him entangled in war

The Guardian, 7 augustus 2026, ‘Tehran has set out a protracted negotiating timetable designed to keep Donald Trump embroiled in the Iran conflict until the midterm elections, in the hope of inflicting the same ruinous blow on his presidency as Jimmy Carter suffered over the 1979-81 US embassy hostage crisis.’ Zie https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/07/iran-war-trump-midterm-ballot? Of https://archive.ph/gtjY6

d. MIVD-directeur had openbaar account bij Strava: activiteiten jarenlang te volgen

Volkskrant, 7 augustus 2026, ‘De directeur van de militaire inlichtingendienst MIVD, admiraal Peter Reesink, had tot deze week een openbaar account bij sportapp Strava. Dat is in strijd met de richtlijnen van Defensie. Inmiddels zijn de gegevens van Reesink niet meer zichtbaar.’ Zie https://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/mivd-directeur-had-openbaar-account-bij-strava-activiteiten-jarenlang-te-volgen~bfe15ff4/

e. Don’t underestimate us’: German shipbuilder boss steers TKMS to large order wins

Financial Times, 9 augustus 2026, ‘Despite a series of deals, Oliver Burkhard stresses the importance of ‘prudent growth’ with a focus on delivery. Oliver Burkhard does not like champagne. Even if he did, the chief executive of German shipbuilder TKMS would not be popping corks, despite just having been picked for what promises to be the biggest deal in the company’s history.’ Zie https://archive.ph/gJPLc

f. De Europese Unie en de jacht op Oekraïense mannen – Van erkende vluchteling naar kanonnenvoer

Recht voor Allen, Marco van Duijn, Substack, 9 augustus 2026, Verplaats je eens in een Oekraïense man die niet wil vechten in de oorlog tegen Rusland. Je land verbiedt je te vertrekken, omdat jouw lichaam nodig is aan het front. Tot nu toe kon je proberen naar de Europese Unie te ontsnappen en zo een vroegtijdig einde aan je leven te voorkomen. Sinds 5 augustus 2026 is die vluchtroute een stuk moeilijker geworden. Op verzoek van de Oekraïense regering wel te verstaan.’ Zie https://rechtvoorallen.substack.com/p/de-europese-unie-en-de-jacht-op-oekraiense.  Zie ook https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aL1N1Qn6n-Q.

i. Yemen’s Houthis attack Saudi refinery after kingdom signs defence pact

Al-Monitor. 9 augustus 2026, ‘Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis have attacked Saudi Aramco’s Jazan refinery, they said on Sunday, two days after the kingdom signed a defence pact with Turkey and Pakistan in response to growing regional instability from the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran.’ Zie https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/yemens-houthis-attack-saudi-refinery-after-kingdom-signs-defence-pact

j. Syria makes deal to take control of Russian bases

Financial Times, 9 augustus 2026, ‘Syria said on Sunday it had reached a deal to take control of two Russian military bases, largely ending Moscow’s military presence in the county. Strategic blow for Moscow as Trump moves closer to Syrian regime.’ Zie https://archive.ph/vOgqK

k. NATO 3.0: The Transatlantic Cage and the Rise of the Bunkerstate

Worldlinesletter, Nel Bonilla, 10 augustus 2026, The transformation of NATO and Europe’s new role as an attritional node. The NATO summit in Ankara has concluded, yet its shadow looms larger than ever. Many analysts have argued that this year’s gathering was primarily a vehicle for supercharging the arms industry. While that is patently true, reducing the summit to defense contracts misses a harsh qualitative shift. Namely: what exactly is the “NATO 3.0” doctrine that has now been formally ratified and publicized?’ Zie de link

https://worldlinesletter.substack.com/p/nato-30-the-transatlantic-cage-and.

l. Russland zum Drohnenvorfall: „zusammengezimmerte Provokation“

Nachdenkseiten.de, 10 augustus 2026, ‘Der Drohnenvorfall am Flughafen Leipzig hat den Kriegstreibern in Deutschland mächtig Aufwind gegeben. Manche unverantwortliche Akteure in Politik und Medien nutzen jetzt unbelegte und keineswegs „naheliegende“ Vorwürfe gegen Russland für riskante und weitreichende Vorstöße, etwa zum NATO-Artikel 4. Es gibt aber auch in deutschen Medien Ausnahmen. Und: Was sagt eigentlich das offizielle Russland zu dem Vorgang? Ein Kommentar von Tobias Riegel.’ Zie https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=154783.

m. Ukraine faces race against time as Russia chokes Black Sea ports

Kyiv Independent, 11 augustus 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-faces-race-against-time-as-russia-chokes-black-sea-ports/

Smoke billowing over the Black Sea is now an everyday sight in Odesa Oblast as Russia continues to strike ports and vessels in Ukrainian waters. But it’s on land that the impact of Russia’s campaign is most keenly felt, with Ukraine facing an economic crisis unless the country finds a solution soon.

n. Russia prepares its ‘final push’ of the war this fall

Kyiv Independent, 11 augustus 2026, ‘In Kyiv and the capitals of its allies, talk of a brutal “winter” awaiting Ukraine because of Russian strikes is a top matter on the agenda. And it’s quite likely that this very fall and winter will become Russia’s own kind of “last push” — an attempt to somehow turn the tide of its war.’ Zie https://kyivindependent.com/russia-prepares-its-final-push-of-the-war-this-fall/

o. Nord Stream and the patriotic idiots

Events in Ukraine, 11 augustus  2026, ‘Most importantly, I find it absolutely logical that the CIA would act through a proxy in destroying Nord Stream II. Even if the Ukrainians failed and drew attention to themselves in doing so, it would still have been a much less dangerous risk than the possibility of direct CIA involvement in destroying critical German infrastructure going public. The US routinely operates through proxies for the most violent and explosive operations.’ Zie https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/nord-stream-and-the-patriotic-idiots.

p. Oekraïne haalt resten van in Rotterdam begraven nationalist terug

Leeuwarder Courant, 12 augustus 2026, ‘In Rotterdam zijn dinsdag de stoffelijke resten opgegraven van een Oekraïense nationalist die in 1938 in de stad werd geliquideerd. De resten worden naar Oekraïne gebracht om daar herbegraven te worden.’ Zie link https://www.lc.nl/buitenland/oekrane-doet-vs-voorstellen-voor-einde-oorlog-zelenski-vraagt-om-meer-druk-op-rusland/158543793.html.

q. Ukraine’s protest movement has run into a wall

Kyiv Independent, 12 augustus 2026, Protesters say they have achieved part of what they set out to do, but now lack a clear path to force the president to meet their central demand. They are now uncertain how to pressure the president into reinstating Fedorov.’ Zie https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-protesters-dont-know-what-to-do-next-as-zelensky-wont-budge/.

r. US strikes in Yemen killed 153 civilians in 2025, says Pentagon review

Al Jazeera, 12 augustus 2026, United States military strikes targeting Yemen’s Houthis killed 153 civilians last year and wounded another 243, according to a Pentagon assessment of the attacks.’ Zie https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/us-strikes-in-yemen-killed-153-civilians-in-2025-says-pentagon-review

s. Putin Can’t Break Down NATO’s Door. He’s Trying the Window

Bloomberg, 12 augustus 2026, ‘Recent reporting says Russian President Vladimir Putin is considering testing the resolve and combat responses of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over the next couple of years. Despite being outgunned in defense spending and seemingly having its hands full in Ukraine, the Russian Federation already appears to be probing the alliance. James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and vice chairman at Carlyle.’ Zie https://archive.ph/LueQk.

 

5. Ukraine’s new plan to pressure Russia remains a mystery to Washington

Kyiv Independent, 13 augustus 2026, ‘Washington has not yet received President Volodymyr Zelensky’s new plan to pressure Russia into ending its war, a U.S. official familiar with the matter told the Kyiv Independent.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-new-plan-to-pressure-russia-remains-a-mystery-to-washington/.

 

6. Sun, sea and bombs in Odesa

Financial Times, 13 augustus 2026, ‘But shortly after midnight, the war came back. Explosions pummelled its ports and historic centre, in one of Russia’s biggest attacks yet on the city that is also a popular vacation spot. When dawn came, the sky was filled with smoke. The destruction of port infrastructure and the intensity of attacks would make it nearly impossible for the country to export this year’s grain harvest.’ Zie de bijlage of https://archive.ph/zuAsy. (Zie ook ’Graanoorlog’ laait op tussen Oekraïne en Rusland: vrees voor prijsstijgingen en honger, Telegraaf, 13 augustus 2026, De aanvallen op havens over en weer tussen Rusland en Oekraïne blijven escaleren. https://archive.ph/upR90)

 

7. Treiben die westlichen Siegesillusionen die Ukraine in den Zusammenbruch?

Berliner Zeitung, Michael von der Schulenburg, 13 augustus 2026, ‘Noch am 26. Juli zeigte sich Ursula von der Leyen bei ihrem Besuch in Kiew voll Siegeszuversicht: Das Blatt habe sich gewendet, die Ukraine habe die Initiative zurückgewonnen. Russland sei in der Defensive. Als Ursache des vermeintlichen Umschwungs nach viereinhalb Jahren eines verheerenden Krieges gilt eine neue „Wunderwaffe“: Drohnen, die mithilfe der von Palantir & Co. bereitgestellten Künstlichen Intelligenz den Krieg tief ins russische Hinterland tragen und dort Ölraffinerien und andere kritische Infrastruktur präzise zerstören.’ Zie de https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/article/treiben-die-westlichen-siegesillusionen-die-ukraine-in-den-zusammenbruch-10288789.

 

8. Machtkampf in der Ukraine: Wie Selenskyj seinen härtesten Konkurrenten kaltstellt

Berliner Zeitung, 13 augustus 2026, ‘Umfragen sehen Saluschnyj klar vor Selenskyj. In Kiew wächst die Nervosität – und der Präsident reagiert mit auffälliger Kälte gegenüber seinem Ex-Armeechef.’ Zie de  bijlage of https://archive.ph/3ydxZ.

 

9. Ukrainian Drones vs NATO Training – 5 Things to Know

Kyiv Post, 13 augustus 2026, ‘Ukrainian drone crews devastated a US armored force in Hohenfels’ Combined Resolve 26 exercise, highlighting NATO vulnerabilities to drone warfare and echoing similar Ukrainian successes at Hedgehog 25 and Aurora 26. Kyiv Post researchers dug into the details of the exercise and the units involved.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://www.kyivpost.com/post/82299.

 

10. Scandal-hit Skelia assault regiment to fight under Azov command as Drapatyi’s reforms gain momentum

Kyiv Independent,13 augustus 2026, ‘Ukraine’s notorious 425th Assault Regiment, better known as Skelia, has been assigned to the command of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard, the regiment’s spokesperson Oleksii Bratushchak said on Aug. 13.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://kyivindependent.com/skelia-assault-regiment-to-fight-together-under-azov-corps-command-as-drapatyis-reforms-gain-momentum/.

 

11. US says lower oil prices, not Iran’s nuclear program, are now top priority in war

AFP, 14 augustus 2026, ‘The top US priority now in the Iran war is no longer its nuclear program but to bring gasoline prices down for American consumers, the vice president said Thursday, with the treasury secretary adding that new economic punishment to wear down Tehran is imminent. Keeping oil and gas cheap for Americans all over the country is goal number one, says JD Vance.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://www.thedailystar.net/news/world/us-israel-war-iran/news/us-says-lower-oil-prices-not-irans-nuclear-program-are-now-top-priority-war-4247526.

 

12. U.S. military has lost roughly 25% of its Reaper drones as Iran war depletes arsenal

Washington Post, 13 augustus 2026, ‘The aircraft, which cost up to $50 million each, have seen heavy use around the Strait of Hormuz — but they are relatively easy targets for Iran and its proxies. The U.S. military has lost at least 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones during the war with Iran, or roughly 25 percent of its fleet, according to three U.S. officials familiar with the matter.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://archive.vn/2xlKd#selection-283.0-823.243.

 

13. Normalisering van kernwapens is gevaarlijk en moet stoppen

PAX, 14 augustus 2026, ‘Voor Nederland zijn kernwapens niet langer taboe. Dat is een trendbreuk waarvan de gevolgen niet te overzien zijn. Het is zeer belangrijk dat de regering op haar schreden terugkeert.’ Zie verder de bijlage of https://paxvoorvrede.nl/nieuws/normalisering-van-kernwapens-is-gevaarlijk-en-moet-stoppen/.

 

Colofon: 

Vredespolitiek verschijnt elke werkdag en wordt samengesteld door Guido van Leemput met dagelijkse medewerking van Kees Kalkman en diverse los-vaste tipgevers.

Voor meer berichten, met name over bewapening, als deze zie ook Vredessite.nl; https://vredessite.nl/index.php.

 

Bij 5. Ukraine’s new plan to pressure Russia remains a mystery to Washington

Kyiv Independent, 13 augustus 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-new-plan-to-pressure-russia-remains-a-mystery-to-washington/

Washington has not yet received President Volodymyr Zelensky’s new plan to pressure Russia into ending its war, a U.S. official familiar with the matter told the Kyiv Independent.

Zelensky said on Aug. 12 that Kyiv and its international partners have developed a joint plan based on pressure against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The plan comes as U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner prepare to visit Ukraine and Russia in another attempt to revive stalled peace talks. “Putin does not want to stop this war, but he will stop it. We have a plan,” Zelensky said.

The U.S. official said Witkoff and Kushner held a call with Ukrainian officials on Aug. 11. The plan was mentioned during the conversation, but Kyiv has not since provided Washington with detailed proposals. “(Witkoff and Kushner) haven’t seen it yet,” the official said.

It remains unclear what the Ukrainian strategy entails. The plan is likely to be shared with Witkoff and Kushner when they visit Kyiv later this month.

The planned trip comes as peace talks have remained frozen since the U.S. began its military campaign against Iran in February. Previous efforts to reach a settlement have repeatedly run into Moscow’s demands.

Kyiv has argued that freezing the current front line would provide the most realistic basis for a ceasefire. Russia continues to demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from parts of Ukraine’s Donbas as a condition for an agreement. Ukraine has rejected the proposal.

In recent month, Ukraine has intensified attacks against Russian military infrastructure, logistics hubs, and strategic targets deep inside Russia.

Russia has also stepped up missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities, repeatedly striking Kyiv and other civilian population centers.

The escalation has increased pressure on Ukraine’s air defense. Kyiv faces shortages of Patriot interceptors, which are needed to defend against Russian ballistic missiles.

 

Bij 6. Sun, sea and bombs in Odesa

Financial Times, 13 augustus 2026, https://archive.ph/zuAsy

In the port city known for its beaches and nightlife, Russian attacks are choking off an export lifeline

In Odesa, the war can disappear for hours, dissolving into the music, sea air and champagne fizz of a summer evening.

On Saturday, the beaches were still crowded as the sun sank over the Black Sea. Techno beats thudded from bars and clubs, restaurant tables spilled on to the sidewalks and people lingered over drinks. Odesa had the easy, restless energy of a city determined to enjoy itself.

But shortly after midnight, the war came back. Explosions pummelled its ports and historic centre, in one of Russia’s biggest attacks yet on the city that is also a popular vacation spot. When dawn came, the sky was filled with smoke.

“This was one of the worst nights for Odesa” since the start of Russia’s war, said Dmytro Barinov, president of the Association of Ports of Ukraine.

Speaking to the FT inside his darkened office the morning after the bombardment, surrounded by maps of the Black Sea, Barinov said the destruction of port infrastructure and the intensity of attacks would make it nearly impossible for the country to export this year’s grain harvest.

Since early July, Russia has been intensifying its assaults on Odesa in an effort to disrupt the maritime trade routes that underpin Ukraine’s wartime economy.

The residents of Odesa are taking it all in their stride. Immediately after the bombings, while emergency workers put out fires, people were drinking champagne with breakfast in a café 20 metres away, recalls Barinov.

But the impact on infrastructure — the region is home to all three of Ukraine’s remaining deepwater ports — will be much longer lasting.

As Ukraine’s economy reels from the war, the fresh assaults on export infrastructure threaten to further choke off a crucial source of income and put a vital link in the global food supply network at risk. Economists estimate a complete shutdown of Black Sea ports could cost Ukraine 1-1.5 per cent of GDP.

“Ukraine is one of the largest grain producers. So cutting us out of the world market will impact and influence half a billion people globally,” said Andrey Stavnitser, co-owner and chief executive of TIS, Ukraine’s largest private port operator, over a Zoom call.

This summer Russia shifted tactics from attacking port infrastructure to also attacking civilian vessels heading to and from Ukraine — which has brought shipping activity to a standstill.

A Turkish-owned cargo vessel, the Golden Leo, was hit by Russian missiles on July 19, killing 10 people on board and sinking the ship, which was carrying Ukrainian corn.

The attacks go both ways. Last week, what was believed to be a Ukrainian drone hit a Turkish-owned cargo ship, ​Nadezhda, in the Black Sea, injuring three crew members, according to Turkey’s maritime authority.

Stavnitser said Russian forces have begun deliberately targeting vessels’ bridges, where crews are concentrated. “They don’t want to disable [the vessels]. They want to kill crew members,” he said.

The damage is visible all along the Odesa coastline, where port facilities and ships bear the scars of Russian strikes.

At the Pivdennyi port near Odesa, two vessels, the Gaia and the Aida, display visible blast marks and giant holes on their bridges from direct hits. Pointing out the damage, Mykyta Hrubov, managing director of TIS, said they were targeted by Russia in recent weeks.

Nearby, an impact crater from a Russian missile strike last week was visible near critical loading equipment.

Pulling out his phone, Hrubov showed the FT a video of another Russian missile that recently exploded and damaged a Cargill storage facility at the port. Holes in the facility’s roof were still visible.

TIS has its own air-defence system around the facility, but it is not capable of stopping Russian ballistic missile attacks, which can only be stopped with US-made Patriot interceptors. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that Ukraine’s stock is far too low, and has asked the US and Europe to sell Kyiv interceptors.

Responding to and working around air raid alerts have become a routine part of running the terminal. Since July, Hrubov estimated there have been 15 to 18 air raid alerts a day.

As if on cue, an air raid siren interrupted Hrubov’s interview with the FT, forcing everyone to take cover. Inside the shelter there was a box of tools with instructions on how to use them to dig yourself out if a strike buries you under debris. Hrubov said a group of workers had found themselves in such a situation recently and all survived.

The interruptions often drag on for an hour or more, meaning on many days a majority of workers’ shifts can be spent sitting in bomb shelters.

The operational consequences of Russia’s relentless attacks are severe. A port cannot simply switch off when ships stop arriving — cranes, rail infrastructure and other equipment must be maintained even while the terminal sits empty and revenue disappears.

“We need resources for maintenance,” Hrubov said. “We need to cover fixed costs for maintenance as much as possible so that in the next period we can all be able to start.”

TIS is also trying to preserve its skilled workforce. It employs about 2,900 people, down from roughly 4,500 before the war.

Stavnitser said “lay-offs could happen” if Russia’s attacks keep up beyond the summer. “As soon as the port stops, the railways stop . . . everything goes on hold.”

TIS’s experience illustrates the volatility of Ukraine’s wartime maritime economy. The company handled a record 36.6mn tonnes of cargo in 2020, including metals, iron ore, grain and containers. After the full-scale invasion, its operations were repeatedly halted and restarted as the security situation changed.

Now, with the latest grain season under way, the company is once again waiting for the security conditions that would allow ships to return.

The impact of the intensifying Russian attacks on shipping traffic has been dramatic. In July, about 15 vessels a day were entering Odesa’s ports, Stavnitser said. That fell to one or two by the end of the month. In August, all traffic has halted, according to Kpler data.

Stavnitser said “only the bravest” would be willing to take the risk of coming to port in Odesa now, with Russian missiles and drones in the air.

Even companies that can afford the exorbitant shipping insurance were choosing not to take the risk, said Barinov.

“It’s less about money,” he added. “It’s a question of life and death.”

Lloyd’s List, the global shipping journal, wrote last week that the Black Sea was now “shipping’s deadliest theatre”, citing reports that at least 23 seafarers were killed by attacks in July alone.

The attacks come at a particularly difficult moment for Ukraine’s agricultural economy, as the country enters the peak of its harvest season. Harvesting begins in the south, including the Odesa region, in early June, before moving northwards through the summer and autumn.

Farmers first bring in barley and wheat, followed by rapeseed, sunflower seed and corn, with the season typically running through October and November.

Despite Russian attacks — which have targeted fields with explosives and flame-thrower “dragon” drones to burn crops — favourable weather conditions are expected to produce a strong harvest this year.

The challenge is how to move that produce to international markets as attacks on the country’s ports intensify. “We have at least 10 million tonnes [left] from the previous crop, which farmers did not sell and the traders did not export,” Barinov said. “So it’s a huge pressure on the storage capacity of Ukraine. We do not have enough storage to keep all this volume and wait.”

Ukraine is considering opening new rail routes overland to the west, but even once operational, those would not have the capacity to absorb all the exports that normally flow through the Black Sea ports.

Stavnitser estimated Ukraine could move about 12mn tonnes of cargo through its western borders annually, compared with roughly 40mn tonnes of grain alone that will need to be exported from this year’s harvest. Steel, containers and other cargoes would add tens of millions of tonnes more.

“We need the ports,” he said. A sustained interruption would threaten not only exporters but also rail operators, truck drivers and other businesses tied to the country’s logistics network.

Despite the constant threat of attacks, Stavnitser said the morale of Odessa’s residents remains high.

“It’s the fifth year of war. You can’t surprise us any more. People have a plan for World War Three, a potential nuke strike,” he quipped with a dash of Odesa’s famous dark humour.

Stavnitser said he recently spoke with the commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, whose units have led many of Kyiv’s long-range drone strikes against Russian energy and military targets. The two men have known each other for two decades, since Brovdi worked in agriculture. As Ukrainian drone attacks have inflicted growing damage on targets inside Russia and contributed to a worsening fuel shortage, Moscow has responded with an intensifying barrage of missiles and drones against Ukraine.

Stavnitser said he had recently called Brovdi to ask whether Russia’s retaliation had prompted him to reconsider the campaign. “He said, ‘Andrey, tell me, do you want me to stop with our deep strikes campaign because of the Russia escalatory retaliation?’” he recalled. “I told him, you have all our support. Keep rocking!”

 

Bij 7. Treiben die westlichen Siegesillusionen die Ukraine in den Zusammenbruch?

Berliner Zeitung, Michael von der Schulenburg, 13 augustus 2026, https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/article/treiben-die-westlichen-siegesillusionen-die-ukraine-in-den-zusammenbruch-10288789

Der konflikterfahrene ehemalige UN-Diplomat Michael von der Schulenburg mahnt den Westen, sich auf eine ukrainische Niederlage vorzubereiten. Ein Gastbeitrag.

Noch am 26. Juli zeigte sich Ursula von der Leyen bei ihrem Besuch in Kiew voll Siegeszuversicht: Das Blatt habe sich gewendet, die Ukraine habe die Initiative zurückgewonnen. Russland sei in der Defensive. Als Ursache des vermeintlichen Umschwungs nach viereinhalb Jahren eines verheerenden Krieges gilt eine neue „Wunderwaffe“: Drohnen, die mithilfe der von Palantir & Co. bereitgestellten Künstlichen Intelligenz den Krieg tief ins russische Hinterland tragen und dort Ölraffinerien und andere kritische Infrastruktur präzise zerstören.

Die russische Wirtschaft – insbesondere der Energiesektor – ist laut dieser Lesart schwer angeschlagen, der von Russland begonnene Krieg in voller Wucht im eigenen Land angekommen. Auch auf dem Schlachtfeld habe die Ukraine mit autonom operierenden „Killerdrohnen“ erhebliche Erfolge erzielt. Diese könnten in einer Todeszone von mindestens 30 Kilometern Breite alles Leben automatisch erfassen und vernichten.

Technologie habe den Mangel an ukrainischen Soldaten somit mehr als ausgeglichen. Russische Soldaten zahlten einen hohen Blutzoll, ohne militärische Erfolge vorweisen zu können. Das müsse den Angreifer zermürben und Putin zwingen, anzuerkennen, dass er diesen Krieg verlieren werde.

Begleitet wurden solche Darstellungen von medienwirksamen Drohnenangriffen auf Moskau und St. Petersburg. Kein Wunder, dass etablierte westliche Medien in den letzten Monaten voller Siegesmeldungen waren. Manche spekulierten gar, Russland könne nur noch ein halbes Jahr durchhalten; ein Umsturz in Moskau sei möglich.

Wendet sich das Blatt zugunsten Russlands?

Die strategisch wichtige Krim sei durch ukrainische Angriffe bereits weitgehend von Russland abgeschnitten. Putin werde als Verlierer an den Verhandlungstisch gezwungen – zu den Bedingungen der europäischen Nato-Staaten, was einer russischen Niederlage gleichkäme. Die Politik, die Ukraine militärisch, politisch und finanziell massiv zu unterstützen, gleichzeitig aber jegliche Gespräche zu verweigern, bis Russland „in die Knie gezwungen“ ist, schien aufzugehen.

Doch ist das so? Oder hat sich das Blatt in Wirklichkeit sogar zugunsten Russlands gewendet?

Auffällig ist, dass seit den ersten Augusttagen kaum noch Berichte über den Kriegsverlauf erscheinen. Die Siegesmeldungen sind weitgehend verstummt. Gleichzeitig mehren sich, aus den USA und auch aus der Ukraine selbst, die Zweifel am Erfolg des Drohnenkriegs im russischen Hinterland.

Man muss nur auf die Warnungen des Generals (und derzeitigen ukrainischen Botschafters in London) Walerij Saluschnyj hören: Der Drohnenkrieg sei wenig erfolgreich und viel zu teuer. Als ehemaliger Oberkommandierender der ukrainischen Streitkräfte sollte er es wissen. Nach Angaben der proukrainischen Kriegsbeobachter Dron-Bomber erzielen die Russen inzwischen eine hohe Rate an Abschüssen ukrainischer Drohnen. Die Absetzung des ukrainischen Verteidigungsministers Mychajlo Fedorow dürfte ebenfalls mit dem sich abzeichnenden Scheitern des Drohnenkriegs zusammenhängen.

Setzt sich die Einsicht durch, dass der Konflikt allein auf diesem Weg nicht zu gewinnen ist?

In dem Fall bliebe die Entwicklung auf dem Schlachtfeld entscheidend. Von dem in westlichen Medien behaupteten militärischen Patt kann keine Rede sein. Nach einem Bericht des ukrainischen Telegram-Kanals besetzten „im Juli dieses Jahres die Streitkräfte der Russischen Föderation 728,45 Quadratkilometer Territorium in der SVO-Zone [Raum der russischen ‚Spezialoperation‘; Anm. d. Red.], was das beste Ergebnis seit Oktober 2024 (mehr als 800 Quadratkilometer) darstellt. (…) Das Tempo der Offensive der russischen Streitkräfte nimmt zu.“

Russische Gebietsgewinne soll es nicht nur im Donbass, sondern auch um Charkiw und in Saporischschja geben. Das Vorankommen ist langsam. Russland führt einen Abnutzungskrieg, dessen primäres Ziel die Vernichtung der gegnerischen Streitkräfte ist. Könnte dieses Ziel mit der Einnahme der letzten ausgebauten Verteidigungsstellungen um die Donbass-Städte Slowjansk und Kramatorsk erreicht sein?

Noch schwerwiegender für die Ukraine ist, dass ihre Drohnenangriffe zu einer Verhärtung der russischen Position geführt haben. Die russische Führung spricht nun offen von Krieg – auch von einem Krieg der Nato gegen Russland – und hat diesen Krieg wesentlich intensiviert. In dieser grausamen Logik übersteigen die Zerstörungen in der Ukraine diejenigen in Russland inzwischen um ein Vielfaches.

Wichtige Brücken zerstört

Entscheidend ist auch, dass die Ukraine über keine nennenswerte Luftverteidigung verfügt und sich gegen massive russische Drohnen- und Raketenangriffe kaum wehren kann, während die Intensität ukrainischer Angriffe angeblich nachlässt.

Das hat bereits Konsequenzen. Die Schwarzmeerhäfen in und um Odessa sollen derart massiv bombardiert worden sein, dass die Ukraine de facto ein „landlocked country“ ist. Wenn die Berichte zutreffen, wäre das ein schwerer Schlag: Bislang wurden rund 70 Prozent der ukrainischen Im- und Exporte sowie 90 Prozent der landwirtschaftlichen Ausfuhren über die Häfen abgewickelt.

Auch sollen wichtige Brücken, die Odessa mit den rumänischen Schwarzmeerhäfen verbinden, etwa die Zatoka-Brücke, zerstört worden sein. Zudem zerstört Russland systematisch Eisenbahn- und Straßenverbindungen, Tankstellen, das Energienetz, Industrieanlagen und Warenlager.

Die europäischen Nato-Staaten können daran wenig ändern; ihnen fehlen die militärischen Kapazitäten. Pläne, eine „Koalition der Willigen“ in Polen zu stationieren oder gar eine Flugverbotszone über der Ukraine zu errichten, sind völlig unrealistisch.

Kein erneutes Engagement der USA

Auch die USA haben kaum noch Waffen zu vergeben. Sie haben außerdem angekündigt, das in Wiesbaden gelegene Nato-Zentrum zur Koordinierung der militärischen Unterstützung der Ukraine vollständig an die Europäer zu übergeben. Es steht sogar die Auflösung dieser für die Ukraine zentralen Einrichtung im Raum. Von einem erneuten militärischen Engagement der USA im Ukraine-Krieg kann also kaum die Rede sein.

Bereits vor der jüngsten Eskalation gab es deutliche Hinweise, dass die ukrainische Armee in erheblichen Schwierigkeiten steckt. Schon bei seinem Amtsantritt im Januar sprach Fedorow von rund 200.000 Deserteuren; andere Parlamentarier nannten noch deutlich höhere Zahlen. Zudem sollen sich etwa zwei Millionen ukrainische Männer dem Einberufungsbefehl entzogen haben.

Welche Zahlen auch immer zutreffen: Sie verweisen auf einen alarmierenden Zustand der ukrainischen Streitkräfte – einen Zustand, der sich weder durch Zwangsrekrutierungen auf offener Straße noch, wie sich nun zeigt, durch KI-gesteuerte Drohnen kompensieren lässt. Auch die von der EU ins Gespräch gebrachte Überlegung, geflüchteten ukrainischen Männern – gegen internationales Recht – den Schutzstatus zu entziehen und sie zurück in die Ukraine und in den Krieg zu schicken, zeugt von Ausweglosigkeit.

Im Mai erklärte der ukrainische Sozialminister Denys Uliutin, dass die Bevölkerung in dem von der Regierung kontrollierten Teil des Landes von einst 52 Millionen (bei der Unabhängigkeit 1991) auf möglicherweise nur 22 Millionen geschrumpft sei. Davon seien rund elf Millionen Sozialhilfeempfänger, überwiegend Rentner und Kriegsversehrte. Er gehe davon aus, dass die Bevölkerungszahl nach Kriegsende weiter sinken werde, da junge Männer – einmal vom Kriegsdienst befreit – ihren Familien in den Westen folgen.

Eine nennenswerte Rückkehr im Ausland lebender Ukrainer erwartet Uliutin nicht. Zum demografischen Niedergang kommen die zunehmende Verarmung, tiefe soziale Ungleichheit, die allgegenwärtige Korruption, eine astronomische Staatsverschuldung und ein wirtschaftlicher Zusammenbruch.

So sieht kein Staat und erst recht keine Armee aus, denen die Medien eine militärische Wende oder gar einen Sieg über eine Großmacht wie Russland zuschreiben.

Natürlich sind derartige Prognosen mit Vorsicht zu bewerten. Doch das offensichtliche Unvermögen des Drohnenkriegs, eine strategische Wende herbeizuführen, sollte den europäischen Nato-Staaten klarmachen, dass die Ukraine am Ende dieser vom Westen mit so viel Hurra begleiteten Eskalation möglicherweise nicht als Sieger dastehen wird.

Stattdessen könnte sie sich in ein immer stärker zerstörtes, entvölkertes und ausblutendes Land verwandeln. Das gibt Anlass zu großer Sorge. Die europäischen Staaten müssen sich fragen, ob die von ihnen geforderte und unterstützte Fortführung des Krieges moralisch zu rechtfertigen ist.

Diplomatie als einzige realistische Perspektive

Mit ihren Illusionen über Siege und Wunderwaffen schaden die europäischen Nato-Staaten der Ukraine nur. Sie müssen ihre Politik endlich an einer realistischen Einschätzung des Kriegsverlaufs ausrichten. So wäre es an der Zeit, darüber nachzudenken, was geschieht, wenn der Widerstand der ukrainischen Armee zusammenbricht und Russland auch Charkiw und Odessa einnimmt. Die dann entstehende Restukraine wäre kaum lebensfähig.

Liegt es nicht im ureigenen Interesse der europäischen Nato-Staaten, ein solches Szenario zu verhindern? Durch ein direktes militärisches Eingreifen der Nato ist das sicher nicht zu erreichen. Ein solches Vorgehen bärge unweigerlich das Risiko eines Nuklearkriegs, den niemand gewinnen kann.

Die einzig realistische Perspektive bietet die Diplomatie. Nach fast fünf Jahren Krieg ist es höchste Zeit, dass die europäischen Nato-Mitglieder aktiv das Gespräch mit Russland suchen. Deutschland sollte den ersten Schritt wagen: als stärkstes Land in der EU, aufgrund seiner geografischen Lage und seiner historischen Verantwortung.

Um die festgefahrenen Positionen auf beiden Seiten zu überwinden, wäre es sinnvoll, eine Annäherung zunächst über eine zivilgesellschaftliche Initiative einflussreicher Persönlichkeiten zu suchen. Dadurch könnte nach Jahren des Schweigens und der Dämonisierung ein erster, vorsichtiger Zugang zu neuer Verständigung gefunden werden.

Europa braucht Frieden, und Frieden in Europa kann es nur mit Russland geben, nicht gegen Russland. Viel Zeit bleibt nicht.

Der 1969 aus der DDR geflohene Michael von der Schulenburg (78) war seit 1978 als Diplomat der Vereinten Nationen in diversen Kriegs- und Krisengebieten in Afrika und Asien tätig. Seit 2024 sitzt er ohne Parteizugehörigkeit für das Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht im Europaparlament.

 

Bij 8. Machtkampf in der Ukraine: Wie Selenskyj seinen härtesten Konkurrenten kaltstellt

Berliner Zeitung, 13 augustus 2026, https://archive.ph/3ydxZ

Umfragen sehen Saluschnyj klar vor Selenskyj. In Kiew wächst die Nervosität – und der Präsident reagiert mit auffälliger Kälte gegenüber seinem Ex-Armeechef.

Zwei Szenen aus den vergangenen Tagen zeigen, wie angespannt das Verhältnis zwischen Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj und dem ukrainischen Botschafter in London, Ex-Oberbefehlshaber Walerij Saluschnyj, mittlerweile ist. Im politischen Kiew ist es ein offenes Geheimnis, dass Saluschnyj großes Interesse hat, der nächste ukrainische Präsident zu werden. Machtmensch Selenskyj versucht hingegen Debatten um das Präsidialamt an der Bankowa-Straße schon im Keim zu ersticken.

Anfang August traf der ukrainische Staatschef in Kiew den britischen Verteidigungsminister Wes Streeting – den ersten offiziellen Vertreter der neuen Regierung von Andy Burnham, der die Ukraine besuchte. Auf ukrainischer Seite nahmen der Erste Stellvertreter des Präsidialamtschefs, Serhij Kyslyzja, sowie der für die Beziehungen zur Armee zuständige Vizechef Pawlo Palisa teil. Saluschnyj, der als Botschafter in Großbritannien residiert und als früherer Armeechef mit der besprochenen Materie – unter anderem der Raketenabwehr – bestens vertraut wäre, fehlte jedoch.

Saluschnyjs Beraterin Oksana Torop erklärte gegenüber ukrainischen Medien, der Botschafter sei zu dem Treffen „nicht eingeladen“ worden. Selenskyjs Berater Dmytro Litwin widersprach dem kurze Zeit später. Die Teilnahme an solchen Treffen sei eine „Initiativgeschichte“, Saluschnyj habe sich demnach gar nicht gemeldet, sondern angeblich einen anderen Termin bevorzugt. Aus dem Umfeld des Botschafters hieß es dagegen laut dem Portal Strana, Saluschnyj habe von dem Treffen mit den Briten erst nach dessen Ende erfahren.

Umfragen sprechen gegen Selenskyj

Ein zweiter Vorfall ereignete sich wenige Tage vorher nach einem Botschaftertreffen: Auf dem gemeinsamen Foto vor dem ukrainischen Außenministerium stellten sich die Teilnehmer um Selenskyj auf – Saluschnyj landete so weit hinten, dass er hinter den vorderen Reihen kaum zu erkennen sei. In der ersten Reihe neben dem Präsidenten habe dagegen unter anderem die damalige (inzwischen entlassene) Botschafterin in den USA, Olha Stefanischyna, gestanden. Ausgerechnet an dem Tag, an dem Selenskyj sie von ihrem Posten abberief und die Antikorruptionsbehörde Nabu ihr Korruption vorwarf.

Der Politologe Andrij Solotarew wertet die Nicht-Einladung zum Treffen mit dem britischen Minister als bewusstes Signal. Saluschnyj sei „eindeutig kein Fremder beim Thema Bewaffnung, aber man hat ihn nicht eingeladen“. Dies sei eine Machtdemonstration gegenüber dem Ex-General, so Solotarew. Im ukrainischen Verteidigungsministerium betrachte man Saluschnyj beim Thema Krieg nicht mehr als einen der „eigenen Leute“.

Der eigentliche Grund für die Verstimmung dürfte in aktuellen Umfragewerten liegen. Nach Zahlen des Instituts Socis würde Selenskyj in einer hypothetischen Stichwahl gegen Saluschnyj deutlich unterliegen. 33,8 Prozent gegen 66,2 Prozent für den Ex-Oberbefehlshaber. Der jetzige Chef des Präsidialamts, Kyrylo Budanow, und der frühere Digital- und Verteidigungsminister Mychajlo Fjodorow lägen auf den Rängen drei und vier.

In einer hypothetischen ersten Runde liegen die Werte zwischen Selenskyj und Saluschnyj enger beieinander. 22,3 Prozent würden Selenskyj die Stimme geben, Saluschnyj käme gar auf nur 21,4 Prozent. Eine zweite Umfrage des Instituts Rating kommt zu etwas anderen, aber ähnlich unbequemen Ergebnissen: 30,6 Prozent für Selenskyj, 20,2 Prozent für Saluschnyj. In der ukrainischen Presse wird sogar schon von einer „Wahlkrise“ in der Präsidialverwaltung gesprochen. Selenskyj spüre immer stärker den Atem seines ehemaligen Armeechefs.

„Die Stichwahl ist eine Schlacht der Negativwerte. Und schon jetzt – noch während des Krieges, wenn das Image des Oberbefehlshabers wirkt – gibt es null Siegchancen. Keine Verwaltungsressource wird eine solche Kluft ausgleichen“, sagt beispielsweise der Abgeordnete Jaroslaw Schelesnjak von der Partei Holos.

Saluschnyjs Strategie

Politische Ambitionen artikuliert Saluschnyj bislang nicht offen. Er meide, so ukrainische Zeitungen, den direkten Schulterschluss mit der Partei Europäische Solidarität von Ex-Präsident Petro Poroschenko, obwohl deren mediales Umfeld ihn sichtbar unterstütze. Solotarew vergleicht sein Vorgehen mit dem römischen Feldherrn Fabius Cunctator, der einst der Strategie des Ausweichens gegenüber Hannibal folgte. Saluschnyj „schlüpft jedes Mal weg, wenn man versucht, von ihm eine gewisse politische Klarheit zu bekommen“, so der Politologe.

Man könne nicht bestreiten, dass diese Taktik bislang funktioniere. Die Menschen in dem kriegs- und krisengebeutelten Land würden sich ihren eigenen Saluschnyj gewissermaßen selbst erdenken, weil er sich kaum äußere. Ob das so bleibe, sei nach Solotarews Einschätzung allerdings fraglich, sollte etwa der ebenfalls ambitionierte Fjodorow mit lauteren Botschaften an die Öffentlichkeit Boden gutmachen.

So verweist das Strana-Portal auf eine wachsende Spannung zwischen den Unterstützerkreisen Saluschnyjs und Fjodorows. Abgeordnete der Europäischen Solidarität, die auf Saluschnyj setzen, würden Fjodorow zunehmend kritisieren, während ihm nahestehende Medien kaum noch Positives über den aktuellen Botschafter im Vereinigten Königreich berichteten – obwohl Saluschnyj dort früher hoch im Kurs gestanden habe. Die Rivalität zwischen Fjodorow und Saluschnyj sei damit zu einer neuen Front im ukrainischen Machtkampf geworden, während im Hintergrund auch Präsidialamtschef Budanow auf seine Chance warte.

Für zusätzlichen Wirbel in den vergangenen Tagen sorgte eine Aussage Saluschnyjs zur Nato-Frage in der Ukraine. Bei einer Diskussion ranghoher Diplomaten zur euroatlantischen Integration soll Saluschnyj gesagt haben: „Ich kenne die Nato sehr gut. Zwölf Jahre habe ich mich persönlich darum gekümmert, dass wir die Nato-Standards beherrschen, und jedes Jahr Märchen darüber gehört, dass wir gleich, gleich, gleich der Nato beitreten. Leider werden wir ihr niemals beitreten!“

Das Haupthindernis sei laut Saluschnyj, dass sich die Ukraine mit ihrem derzeitigen Entwicklungsstand der Streitkräfte unmöglich einer Organisation anschließen könne, die – wie er es formuliert habe – noch mit Doktrinen aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg arbeite. Sicherheitsgarantien solle Kiew stattdessen in anderen militärischen Bündnissen suchen, etwa in der von Großbritannien initiierten Joint Expeditionary Force, einer Verteidigungskoalition zehn nordeuropäischer Staaten.

Das ukrainische Außenministerium sah sich daraufhin zu einer Klarstellung gezwungen: Der Kurs auf einen Nato-Beitritt bleibe „unverändert“, erklärte Außenamtssprecher Heorhij Tychyj gegenüber dem öffentlich-rechtlichen Sender Suspilne. Ein derzeit funktionierendes System kollektiver Sicherheit außerhalb des Washingtoner Vertrags gebe es nicht.

Besonders scharf reagierte die zwischen Fraktionen stehende, präsidentennahe Abgeordnete Marjana Besuhla. Sie unterstellte Saluschnyj auf Telegram, ihm sei wohl geraten worden, seine vermeintlich russlandnahe Gesinnung einer breiten Öffentlichkeit zu offenbaren. Weiter warf Besuhla Teilen der militärischen Führung in Kiew vor, sie hätten die Armee verkleinert, an der Ausrüstung verdient und sich stets gegen Führungsstärke und Nato-Standards gesträubt – wer aus dem Militär in die Politik wechsle, würde am Ende das Land an „Russland verkaufen, ohne sich umzudrehen“. Eine offene Medienkampagne gegen Saluschnyj hat es in der ukrainischen Medienlandschaft nach seinen Nato-Äußerungen jedoch nicht gegeben.

 

Bij 9. Ukrainian Drones vs NATO Training – 5 Things to Know

Kyiv Post, 13 augustus 2026, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/82299

Ukrainian drone crews devastated a US armored force in Hohenfels’ Combined Resolve 26 exercise, highlighting NATO vulnerabilities to drone warfare and echoing similar Ukrainian successes at Hedgehog 25 and Aurora 26.

A news article broken by the Wall Street Journal on Wednesday reported that a Ukrainian drone unit participating in NATO training in Germany was pitted against a US Army tank brigade and that the outcome of that simulated engagement was a decisive Ukrainian victory with almost all the American armored vehicles “destroyed.” Kyiv Post researchers dug into the details of the exercise and the units involved.

1. Where, when and what was exactly going on in these exercises and why were Ukrainians there?

The exercise was a two-week field wargame called Combined Resolve that took place in the second half of April 2026 and into the first days of May. The main unit doing the training was a US-based “heavy” unit – primarily armed with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and helicopters – called the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team of 1st Cavalry Division, based in Fort Hood, Texas. The brigade was deployed in Europe as part of a US deterrence plan, now probably cancelled by the Trump administration, to field US ground combat brigades in East Europe. About 3,500 US soldiers participated in the exercise. Hohenfels is NATO’s largest training area for maneuver training. Force-on-force training at Hohenfels has been a standard NATO training evolution since the 1950s.

Since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, Hohenfels has become NATO’s premier training site for practicing maneuver warfare against a peer adversary in conventional combat conditions. Weapons effects are simulated by using weapons loaded with blanks and lasers attached to the weapons that shoot when a blank is fired, and by fitting laser-sensitive sensors to soldiers and combat vehicles. Observation officers/judges use artillery simulators and lasers of their own to simulate artillery and some long-range systems. Although the training, amounting to a giant wargame using laser tag, can’t replicate the fear of war, most soldiers say force-on-force exercises at Hohenfels fairly accurately replicate how weapons work in simulated battles: intelligent tactics mostly work, and bad tactics almost always fail.

The remains were returned to Ukraine as part of repatriation efforts involving Ukrainian security, defense, and law enforcement agencies.

Units deployed to Hohenfels for the training included, according to open sources, the 3rd ArmoredBrigade headquarters, 6th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, a heavy reconnaissance formation, alongwith attachments of combat engineers, artillery, and support units. The brigade HQ at the exercises, with call sign Greywolf, was beefed up by helicopters and M1A1 tanks from 2-37 Armor. These are all Regular Army ground combat formations mostly based in Ft. Hood, Texas, with the permanent mission of immediate readiness to deploy to and fighting a conventional war.

The Hohenfels training area has a permanently based US Army unit called 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, whose full-time job is simulating the “enemy” for units coming to fight simulated battles there. The unit, usually called OPFOR, tries to use Russian/Iranian/Chinese tactics and operates vehicles that simulate tanks and other fighting vehicles from those countries. In December 2025, the unit stood up a brand-new company that only uses drones, primarily a short-range quadcopter aircraft called Archer Nero. The OPFOR drone unit at Hohenfels is nicknamed Eerie Company.

A small number of Ukrainian operators and aircraft, reportedly two or four actual flight teams or fewer than 20 pilots and technicians, participated in the Hohenfels training. They were from a well-known Ukrainian drone unit called the 412th Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces, “Nemesis.” Ukrainian drone units participating in NATO maneuver training dates back at least to 2025. During the exercise, the Ukrainians first flew on the side of the OPFOR against the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division units, and then later on switched to work as support units and trainers for the 3rd ABCT units as they continued their battles against the OPFOR. The simulated war was fought on mostly dry ground in fair weather, so flying conditions were good.

2. Is it true the Ukrainians in simulated combat demolished a major US force operated by 3rd Brigade?

The answer to that is clearly “yes,” but there are some qualifications. According to the WSJ and US military news reports, in at least one of the battle scenarios, a movement to attack or an actual attempted assault by US forces against an OPFOR position, operators from 412th Brigade “Nemesis” easily located the approaching Americans thanks in part to dust plumes. Ukrainian pilots scored simulated hits on the attacking tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with first-person-view (FPV) drones with relative ease, and that US armored vehicles evaluated damaged and stopped were hunted down and destroyed by follow-up bomber drones, as were US infantrymen and light vehicles that took to cover once their protecting armored vehicles were lost. The tactics used by the Ukrainians at Hohenfels were, per reports, identical to tactics used by Ukrainian drone units in combat against Russia for more than two years. According to the reports, the American units had standard electronic warfare and counter-drone systems, and the supporting intelligence networks had full access, at least theoretically, to tactical intelligence generated by major US reconnaissance assets like satellite overflights, electronic intercepts, and deep spy networks. Nevertheless, at least in the large attack/heavy reconnaissance evolution of the training, the Ukrainian drone operators inflicted heavy enough “losses” on the US forces to render them combat ineffective and force judges to “bring back to life” destroyed equipment and soldiers, because had the 3rd Armored HQ been obliged to make up the losses using standard replacement and supply, the training would have ground to a halt for lack of US combat units available to go fight.

Available sources don’t specify the actual numbers of US “casualties”; however, a 3,500-man US brigade battle group would normally field at least 200 armored vehicles of various types. The main training unit, 6th Squadron 9th Cavalry, if performing a movement to contact with reinforcements, would probably field about 30-40 infantry fighting vehicles or other light armored vehicles, and about a dozen tanks. In the Russo-Ukrainian War, probably the most massive Russian armored assault to be stopped by drones took place on March 30, 2024, near the city of Tonenke, just west of Avdiivka, during which Kremlin forces pushed 48 armored vehicles towards prepared Ukrainian defenses and lost half that force in a few hours to drone strikes backed by artillery. A similar defeat was suffered by Russian forces this year, attacking near the village of Shakhove, on July 22, with some 70-80 vehicles sent out into the open and at least 65, among them seven tanks, destroyed by Ukrainian drones.

It’s important to keep in mind that the Ukrainians’ use of drone tactics widely practiced throughout the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to “demolish” six of nine US Cavalry took place in only one of several battle scenarios during the Hohenfels training.

3. What else happened in the exercise and what was the Ukrainians’ role?

Open-source information covering the exercise points to a standard set of training scenarios intended to put the training units through their paces and to force them to work under pressure. One description of the training event script, unconfirmed, suggested that in the early phases of the exercise the Greywolf/3rd Armored force conducted a reconnaissance and advance to contact into territory held by OPFOR, and then set up a hasty defense to hold ground gained and recover from casualties.

In subsequent days, elements of the Greywolf force probed the OPFOR position to find strongpoints and other targets, while dispersing and concealing friendly forces. Later on in the exercise, the Ukrainians switched sides and worked side by side with 3rd Armored headquarters officers and NCOs to practice cooperative reconnaissance and fire support.

According to an official report on Eerie Company’s activities, a main focus of the exercise was determining best practices and tactics in a drone-dense battle environment. As OPFOR, Eerie’s job was to “replicate modern battlefield threat” using drones to detect and attack training units and electronic warfare systems (jammers) to make communications for the training units more difficult. A May 4 article published on the US Army website army.mil identified the main drone used by the Americans to simulate “enemy” drones as a Neros Archer, a small quadcopter aircraft similar in performance to Ukrainian FPV drones used in actual combat, but costing about three times more.

The 412th Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Brigade “Nemesis,” like most Ukrainian drone units, is armed with a packed golf bag of combat aircraft ranging from throwaway FPV drones costing less than $400 to Vampire hexacopter bomber/minelayer drones, Hornet interceptor drones, Morrigan fixed-wing drones, and R18/R34 heavy octocopter drones. Reports did not say which pieces of that inventory deployed to Hohenfels to augment the Americas’ Archer drones.

A little surprisingly, given the Ukrainians’ skill and actual performance in the training, the US Army write-up on Eerie did not mention the Ukrainians’ presence. US Army video and still images from the training, likewise, showed plenty of drone activity, but gave no hint of Ukrainian soldiers or aircraft ever participating in training with 3rd Armored Brigade at Hohenfels.

4. What’s there to know about this Ukrainian drone unit Nemesis?

Ukraine’s USF Brigade Nemesis is usually considered one of the most experienced and combat-effective drone units in all the AFU, and therefore, likely in any military anywhere. Yaroslav Honchar, a former IT marketing consultant and co-founder of the unit in 2014, during Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, is the commander.

According to the commander of Ukraine’s unmanned forces, a former grain trader named Robert Brovdi, a typical Ukrainian Unmanned Aircraft Brigade usually numbers between 1,000-1,500 men and women and fields around 300 individual drone teams collectively able, under normal circumstances, to control and absolutely deny Russian advance across 100 kilometers (62 miles) of fighting front. Based on open sources, aside from support elements like headquarters, medical, personnel, and logistics, in a typical day of combat, a brigade like Nemesis flies somewhere between 150-400 air missions daily, along with another 10-20 field movements by ground drones.

As the NATO training exercise was happening, with a probable 15-20 operators absent, the majority of the men and women of the 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade “Nemesis” were in combat or supporting tactical combat operations in the southern Hulyaipole sector in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region.

Per the unit news feed, back in Ukraine, in wartime operations, both the brigade’s FPV and bomber drone units reported successful strikes against Russian armored vehicle parks 10-30 kilometers behind enemy lines, including an April 14 night of sorties destroying most of the vehicles and earth-moving equipment of a Russian combat engineer battalion.

A count of vehicle kills for March and April published by the brigade identified 260 Russian vehicles, some motorcycles, and dune buggies, destroyed by drone strikes. All kills reportedly were documented by drone video, but Kyiv Post was only able to review about 10% of the strike imagery. Five days later, the brigade anti-aircraft division scored a rare kill using an interceptor drone of a Russian Shahed kamikaze drone.

An elite long-range strike element of the brigade, during April, flew more than 30 attacks against Russian shadow fleet tankers operating in the Black Sea, and against Russian shore facilities servicing shipping and oil transfers. Reportedly, seven ships were hit. The brigade’s air defense suppression unit claimed 17 Russian anti-aircraft missile systems and 12 Russian air defense radars destroyed in 2026 strikes through April.

5. Is NATO learning the lesson that Ukrainian drones and drone tactics (which don’t differ significantly from Russia) are devastating to conventionally configured and commanded NATO ground units?

That doesn’t seem to be the case. The Combined Resolve exercise was not the first but the third in two years, in which NATO training units were pitted against Ukrainian drone units and found themselves cut to pieces in simulated combat.

The very first time such a training defeat took place was during NATO’s Hedgehog 2025 exercise in Estonia, from May 5-23. More than 16,000 troops from 12 countries participated in the exercise, among them, ironically, bomber and reconnaissance drones from 412th Brigade Nemesis. During the maneuvers, 412th operators, along with FPV crews from another highly competent Ukrainian drone unit, 427th USF Brigade “Rarog,” helped play the role of OPFOR against a crack British infantry unit (1st Mercian Battlegroup) and the 1st Infantry Brigade, the Estonian Division. During a simulated counterattack by those NATO units, a group of about 10 Ukrainian drone operators found and, in simulated combat, destroyed at least 17 British/Estonian combat vehicles, inflicted dozens of notional casualties, and bottled up survivors on woodland roads overflown by Ukrainian FPVs.

Trapped vehicles included Challenger 2 tanks, Warrior IFVs and artillery. Exercise commanders following the Ukrainian successes “brought the killed and wounded back to life” so that the training could continue. The second time NATO forces encountered Ukrainian drones in training was during the Aurora 26 exercises held in Gotland, Sweden, taking place from April 27-May 13, almost simultaneously with 3rd Armored’s rotation to Hohenfels. The main training formation was the professional Swedish Gotland Regiment under the command of the Gotland Brigade Combat Group, with Danish Home Guard, US air defense, and British infantry attachments.

The Ukrainian contingent was drawn not from the elite USF forces but from frontline drone units supporting the veteran 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine “Azov,” among them pilots and technicians from a former public duties brigade called “Presidential,” and a newly raised infantry brigade called “Lubart.” News reports put the total number of Ukrainian soldiers participating in the training at 15-17. Drones used were only FPV replica drones carrying sandbags.

According to one report, the Ukrainians also brought along jamming-proof fiber-optic drones but found them unnecessary because the training NATO units seemed either unwilling or incapable of jamming the drones attacking them. According to Swedish news reports, the Ukrainians repeatedly located and notionally destroyed Swedish/NATO vehicles, and in one scenario “destroyed” 28 of 32 vehicles attempting an advance.

According to Ukrainian military news reports, the casualty-producing NATO tactics inappropriate to drones used in the Hedgehog exercise in 2025 had not changed in the Combined Resolve and Aurora exercises taking place a full 11 months later. A news report in Ukraine on the Gotland training from that time, unconfirmed but widely reported, said that Ukrainian pilots quit counting once the kill count passed 30.

 

Bij 10. Scandal-hit Skelia assault regiment to fight under Azov command as Drapatyi’s reforms gain momentum

Kyiv Independent,13 augustus 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/skelia-assault-regiment-to-fight-together-under-azov-corps-command-as-drapatyis-reforms-gain-momentum/

Ukraine’s notorious 425th Assault Regiment, better known as Skelia, has been assigned to the command of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard, the regiment’s spokesperson Oleksii Bratushchak said on Aug. 13.

The large and controversial assault unit, which had numbered in the thousands and been fighting across multiple sector sectors of the front line in assault and rapid reaction roles, will also likely be brought together to fight in one sector, Bratushchak told Ukrainian YouTube Channel Butusov Plus.

The decision to comes on the back of a series of moves by new Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi, who, upon taking the post on July 21, quickly announced an audit of manpower allocation between units.

Skelia, which has received a disproportionate share of Ukraine’s precious mobilized recruits, was expanded rapidly under the personal patronage and supervision of Drapatyi’s predecessor as Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, to whom the regiment — along with other units of the newly-formed Assault Forces grouping — directly answered.

Soon after, the General Staff ordered flows of newly mobilized Ukrainian soldiers had ceased to units of the Assault Forces, including Skelia.

On Aug. 7, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing military sources, Skelia personnel began to be transferred to other units upon the order of the high command.

In the interview, Bratushchak confirmed both the cease in new replenishment and the transfer of Skelia personnel to other units, but denied that the regiment was being disbanded.

The military’s handling of manpower became a major source of public criticism of Syrskyi, who was dismissed by President Volodymyr Zelensky after protests over the dismissal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov expanded to include demands for his removal.

In the weeks leading up to Syrskyi’s dismissal, Skelia dominated headlines as a notorious example of the inhumane treatment of soldiers, after an investigation by Ukrainian media outlet Babel found dozens of cases of the death of service members during training.

After the investigation, the regiment’s commander Yurii Harkavyi was suspended from his post. Harkavyi has not been restored to his post at the time of publication, with Skelia led by acting commander Oleh Adamov, Bratushchak told the Kyiv Independent.

With over 10,000 soldiers split between at least ten battalions across Ukraine’s long front line, Skelia forces have seen action in some of the most intense fighting of the past year, including in the brutal urban battles of Kupiansk, Pokrovsk, and Kostiantynivka.

Together with Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces, the regiment has played an active role in counterattacks across the southern front line, where President Zelensky announced on Aug. 12 that 745 square kilometers had been liberated in over six month of offensive operations.

At the same time, Skelia also been criticized for its allegedly reckless approach to the lives of its soldiers when conducting assault operations, with some prominent Ukrainian volunteers, ex-commanders and thought leaders comparing the unit’s tactics to those of Russian forces.

On July 20, just as the protest movement’s calls to replace Syrskyi were reaching their peak, two Skelia soldiers, who had just featured in a video posted by the unit raising the Ukrainian flag in central Kostiantynivka, were filmed by the Russian side after being taken prisoner.

In public interviews, Syrskyi acknowledged the uneven distribution in favor of assault units, but justified it by citing their heavier losses, suffered while undertaking difficult and costly assault operations.

According to Bratushchak, the assignment of Skelia — part of the Ground Forces — to Azov’s corps command does not entail the regiment’s transfer into the structure of the corps, part of the Interior Ministry’s National Guard.

The 1st Corps of the National Guard, better known as Azov, is made up of five National Guard maneuver brigades, one artillery brigade, and an unmanned systems regiment.

Since August 2025, the corps has held one of the most intense parts of the front line, near the city of Dobropillia in Donetsk Oblast.

The corps is led by legendary Ukrainian commander Denys Prokopenko, who led the defense of the Azovstal Steel Plant in the surrounded city of Mariupol in the first months of Russia’s full scale invasion in 2022, after which he spent four months in Russian captivity, was released in a prisoner exchange, and took command of the reformed Azov Brigade.

Asked by the Kyiv Independent to confirm the news of Skelia’s assignment to the Azov Corps’ command, the corps has not responded at the time of publication.

Whether or not Skelia units would be used in their old assault and clearing roles or whether they would reinforce the brigades’ depleted infantry lines would be up to the Azov corps command, Bratushchak told the Kyiv Independent.

 

Bij 11. US says lower oil prices, not Iran’s nuclear program, are now top priority in war

AFP, 14 augustus 2026, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/world/us-israel-war-iran/news/us-says-lower-oil-prices-not-irans-nuclear-program-are-now-top-priority-war-4247526.

Keeping oil and gas cheap for Americans all over the country is goal number one, says JD Vance

The top US priority now in the Iran war is no longer its nuclear program but to bring gasoline prices down for American consumers, the vice president said Thursday, with the treasury secretary adding that new economic punishment to wear down Tehran is imminent.

The comments by Vice President JD Vance and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent illustrate the powerful leverage Tehran has gained by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz.

Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon — consistently touted by President Donald Trump as his main reason for the war — now takes a back seat to getting oil flowing again freely through the strait, Vance said on Fox News.

Vance’s comments underscored the stark reality that the war now centers on control of the Strait of Hormuz, the critical fuel supply conduit that was open before Trump started the war along with Israel in late February.

Iran has all but shut it down in retaliation and thus found a crucial bargaining chip against Trump as he struggles to find a way out of the war and shies away from resuming large-scale attacks.

The 80-year-old president’s approval rating is plummeting, the war is unpopular among Americans and midterm elections are approaching in November. Republicans fear Trump and the war, which has caused gasoline prices to soar, will cost them their control of Congress.

“I know that oil is down today and it’s way down from the highs in the early days of the conflict,” Vance said on Fox News. “That’s goal number one — keep oil and gas cheap for Americans all over our country.”

“And then obviously goal number two is ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon,” he added.

‘Low-keying it’

The vice president has been among the members of the administration most skeptical of the offensive launched against Iran in late February.

These remarks, however, appear to confirm the more cautious approach now favored by the US president, which involves maintaining strong economic pressure on Iran by blockading its ports and preventing it from selling oil.

Heralding more economic punishment, Bessent threatened to subject Iran to economic isolation “like the world has never seen before.” He said new measures are expected next week.

Only days ago Trump had said an agreement to reopen the strait was imminent. Now his administration seems to be digging in, with diplomacy on hold as he hopes economic suffering will cause Iran to yield. “We are low-keying it,” Trump said Sunday. “We are only semi-negotiating with them. We are just watching Iran with its huge inflation and the fact they have no money,” Trump told the news outlet Axios.

The US military reportedly burned through stockpiles of costly high-tech missiles and other weapons in the months since the war started at a cost of billions and is now reportedly running low, limiting Trump’s options for resuming attacks on Iran.

“Sometimes we’re focused on the energy piece of it because we want Americans to be able to afford the price of oil and gas. Sometimes we’re obviously focused on the military… on the nuclear program,” Vance also said.

Trump had said recently he would hold off on attacking Iran again only if an agreement were reached quickly to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Now Iran has set a list of conditions for reopening the passageway that the Trump administration is unlikely to accept: an end to the war on all fronts, the lifting of the US blockade of Iranian ports, the end of sanctions, the release of frozen assets and compensation for wartime damage.

Those conditions echo the terms of a so-called memorandum of understanding which was reached in June and collapsed as fighting resumed. It included a provision to create a $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran.

 

Bij 12. U.S. military has lost roughly 25% of its Reaper drones as Iran war depletes arsenal

Washington Post, 13 augustus 2026, https://archive.vn/2xlKd#selection-283.0-823.243

The aircraft, which cost up to $50 million each, have seen heavy use around the Strait of Hormuz — but they are relatively easy targets for Iran and its proxies.

The U.S. military has lost at least 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones during the war with Iran, or roughly 25 percent of its fleet, according to three U.S. officials familiar with the matter.

The Reaper is used to conduct surveillance and targeted strikes, and it can cost between $30 million and $50 million depending on the type of sensors and weapons it carries, according to the Air Force. The potential taxpayer cost of recent losses is over $1.3 billion for that weapon system alone.

The aircraft have seen heavy use around the Strait of Hormuz, the vital shipping route that has become a major flash point in the conflict — and a key obstacle to negotiating a lasting peace deal. But the drones fly slowly and often at low altitudes, making them relatively easy targets for Iran’s military and its regional proxies in Yemen and Iraq.

A fourth U.S. official, who like the others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss Pentagon data, said that not all of the lost Reapers were shot down. An unspecified number crashed after their operators’ communications link to the drones failed, the official said.

The Reaper joins a growing list of U.S. weapons and munitions that have been drained by the Iran war and years of American military support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia.

In the Iran campaign’s first month, U.S. forces fired more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles and more than 1,000 Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles, significantly cutting into stockpiles of a key long-range strike capability and the military’s most in-demand air-defense systems, The Post reported previously.

Such shortages have constrained President Donald Trump’s military options as tensions with Tehran remain high and forced U.S. commanders in the region to change defensive tactics and hold missiles in reserve if they determine that an incoming Iranian missile is unlikely to harm anyone.

The Pentagon, which declined to comment for this article, has consistently denied reports that its weapons stockpiles are running low. At the same time, the Trump administration has asked Congress for tens of billions of dollars in funding to offset costs incurred by the Iran war and to replenish supplies.

As The Post reported last week, Trump confronted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth about the state of the U.S. stockpile. The encounter occurred July 31, on the sidelines of a Cabinet meeting at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland.

The shortages have appeared to embolden Iran, which has intensified its demands for control of the Strait of Hormuz and reparations for damage the country has sustained since Trump ordered the start of hostilities on Feb. 28.

There were approximately 185 Reapers in the U.S. military fleet — 165 in the Air Force and 20 in the Marine Corps — before the conflict began, according to public budget data and the services. That figure does not include Reapers operated by U.S. intelligence agencies. To date, none of the Marines’ Reapers have been lost, a spokesman, Lt. Col. Joshua Benson, said in a statement. Those operate primarily in the Asia-Pacific.

In May, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, a senior Air Force officer at the Pentagon, told the Senate that the number of remaining drones had fallen to about 135. At the time, Tabor told lawmakers he was “concerned” about the losses and that the Air Force was exploring how to quickly replenish its fleet.

The Pentagon is phasing out the General Atomics-produced Reaper and envisions a replacement fleet of less expensive armed surveillance drones that can swarm their targets.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is trying to shore up lawmaker support for a $67 billion Iran war supplemental budget that it says is vital to restocking the Pentagon’s arsenal. Even if Congress approves the funding, it will be years before stockpiles depleted by the conflict in Iran and the munitions sent to Ukraine are reconstituted.

Hegseth told the Senate in July that the Pentagon would have to curtail military trainings without a quick infusion of additional funding as the Iran war strains the defense budget. He estimated that the conflict would cost $37.5 billion through the end of September, though that total does not include the cost of rebuilding U.S. bases in the Middle East damaged by Iranian strikes.

Republicans in Congress are divided on the best strategy to secure the war-related funding and have left Washington for their August recess.

This week, the right-leaning American Enterprise Institute think tank released report a examining the military’s effort to increase production of critical munitions. It found that in some cases the Pentagon’s plans have “key dependencies,” including a significant expansion of the defense industry’s factory output. For example, it could take years to replenish THAAD interceptors used throughout the war, the report found. The missile defends against incoming ballistic missiles.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s maximum production rate is 96 a year — but the Pentagon seeks 857 of them in next year’s defense budget, and almost 2,600 total over the next five years. At current production rates, it would require “approximately 27 years” to the fulfill the request, AEI found.

It takes almost three years to manufacture a single THAAD interceptor, said AEI senior fellow Todd Harrison, the report’s author. “Even if you ordered them today, delivery wouldn’t be until President Trump leaves office,” Harrison said.

Other U.S. munitions reviewed by AEI had similar timelines, the report showed.

Although Hegseth has met with many of the companies responsible for building key munitions, and secured what the Pentagon calls framework agreements to increase production, there are no contracts or funding yet for those firms to move forward.

 

Bij 13. Normalisering van kernwapens is gevaarlijk en moet stoppen

PAX, 14 augustus 2026, https://paxvoorvrede.nl/nieuws/normalisering-van-kernwapens-is-gevaarlijk-en-moet-stoppen/

Voor Nederland zijn kernwapens niet langer taboe. Dat is een trendbreuk waarvan de gevolgen niet te overzien zijn. Het is zeer belangrijk dat de regering op haar schreden terugkeert.

In het coalitieakkoord toont het kabinet-Jetten zich voorstander van het versterken van Europese nucleaire afschrikking. Daarom wordt momenteel samenwerking gezocht met Frankrijk, dat als enige EU-land over kernwapens beschikt. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Berendsen liet ook weten dat het deels Nederlandse bedrijf Urenco gaat helpen bij het Britse kernwapenprogramma.

Ondertussen blijven Amerikaanse kernwapens op Nederlandse bodem liggen. En op recente berichten dat Finland en Litouwen kernwapens op eigen bodem willen toestaan en dat de VS kernwapens willen plaatsen in het oosten van Europa volgt geen enkele kritiek. Kernwapens worden in rap tempo genormaliseerd.

Opvallend is dat met geen woord wordt gerept over de desastreuze gevolgen van daadwerkelijke inzet. Dat is problematisch, omdat atoombommen de unieke capaciteit bezitten om de gehele mensheid uit te roeien. Het taboe is er niet voor niets.

Catastrofaal

Op 6 augustus 1945 werd het kernwapen voor het eerst ingezet. De VS bombardeerden toen de Japanse stad Hiroshima. Ruim 70.000 mensen waren op slag dood door de ongekende ontploffing en de vuurzee die volgde. In de dagen, weken en maanden daarna stierf een vergelijkbaar aantal mensen, onder andere door stralingsziekte. Op 9 augustus explodeerde de tweede kernbom boven Nagasaki, met nog eens 74.000 doden. Ruim 90 procent van de
slachtoffers bestond uit burgers.

Sindsdien zijn er bommen ontwikkeld die nog veel vernietigender zijn. Specifiek waterstofbommen, die duizend keer krachtiger kunnen zijn. Een zo’n bom kan een grote stad volledig van de kaart vegen. In 1945 ontploften twee atoombommen. Van een geheel andere orde is een kernoorlog. Naar de gevolgen hiervan zijn studies gedaan. Zo zou een ‘beperkte’ nucleaire oorlog tussen India en Pakistan direct tot tientallen miljoenen doden leiden. Dat is dan het resultaat van 100 tot 500 kernwapens – slechts een paar procent van het wereldwijde totaal. Een kernoorlog tussen de VS en Rusland waarbij duizenden bommen ontploffen, kan resulteren in vele honderden miljoenen doden. Dit is niet eens het ergste. Na de strijd volgt mogelijk een nucleaire winter. Wetenschappers berekenden dat er bij een kernoorlog zoveel roet en stof hoog de lucht in komt dat de aarde jarenlang meerdere graden afgekoeld kan zijn. Hierdoor mislukken oogsten, waardoor hongersnood en chaos ontstaan, met als gevolg mogelijk miljarden doden. Dit alles nog los van de vraag of de mensheid het überhaupt overleeft.

Afgrond

De positieve passage over nucleaire wapens in het coalitieakkoord van het kabinet is een trendbreuk, die kennelijk zonder enige discussie tussen VVD, D66 en CDA tot stand is gekomen. Maar discussie over kernwapens is nodig, juist nu. Omdat er een wapenwedloop woedt in een wereld waarin spanningen tussen grootmachten toch al akelig hoog opgelopen zijn en diplomatie verleerd lijkt. De huidige dreiging werd begin dit jaar nog eens onderstreept door de wetenschappers van de Doomsday Clock, die meten hoe dicht de mensheid bij de (zelf gecreëerde) afgrond staat. Momenteel een schamele 85 seconden.

Discussie is ook nodig uit eigenbelang. Door Amerikaanse kernwapens op vliegbasis Volkel is Nederland namelijk een doelwit, zoals ook beschreven staat in het huiveringwekkende boek ”Kernoorlog, het scenario” van Annie Jacobsen. Kleine landen zijn bovendien bijzonder kwetsbaar voor een kernaanval, omdat direct het hele economische en bestuurlijke centrum weggevaagd zal worden. Kernontwapening zou juist voor Nederland prioriteit moeten zijn.

Over kernwapens wordt meer en meer gesproken alsof het normale wapens zijn. De gruwelijke gevolgen van daadwerkelijk gebruik worden hierbij vakkundig verzwegen, terwijl organisaties als het Rode Kruis geen enkel scenario hebben als het zover komt. Hulp bieden is dan immers onmogelijk. Normalisering van kernwapens is gevaarlijk en moet stoppen. Het is de hoogste tijd voor een eerlijk gesprek over deze massavernietigingswapens.

Dit artikel van PAX-directeur Rolien Sasse verscheen eerder in het Reformatorisch Dagblad